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THE NEW POOR AT OUR GATES: GLOBAL JUSTICE IMPLICATIONS FOR 




Abstract: The Article explains why international trade and tax arrangements should advance 
global wealth redistribution in a world of enhanced economic integration.  Despite the 
indisputable importance of global poverty and inequality, contemporary political philosophy 
stagnates over the controversy of whether distributive justice obligations should extend 
beyond the political framework of the nation state.  This stagnation results from the difficulty 
of reconciling liberal impartiality with notions of state sovereignty and accountability.  The 
Article offers an alternative approach that bypasses the controversy of the current debate.  It 
argues that international trade results in relational distributive duties when domestic parties 
engage in transactions with foreign parties that suffer from an endowed vulnerability—such 
as extreme poverty prevalent in the developing world.  These relational duties differ from 
“traditional” distributive claims because they rely on actual economic relationships, rather 
than upon hypothetical social-contract scenarios.  The Article establishes that in a 
competitive market, private parties cannot address these relational distributives duties by 
themselves, because doing so would put them at a competitive disadvantage, and argues that 
the only common-action solution to this systemic problem in the current global political 
setting is wealth transfers among states.  The Article proceeds to suggest some policy 
implication of this normative analysis in the field of international tax law. It points out that 
the allocation of taxing rights is a form of wealth allocation that divides globalization’s 
revenue-proceeds among nations.  As such, tax allocation arrangements should help “correct” 
international trade relationships that fail to meet relational distributive standards.  This 
discussion stresses a point frequently neglected by both the tax and political philosophy 
literatures—that real-world attempts to promote a more just distribution of global wealth 
could greatly benefit from integrating distributive considerations in tax allocation 
arrangements. 
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“If there will be among you a needy person, from one of your brothers in one of your 
cities, in your land … you shall not harden your heart, and you shall not close your hand 
from your needy brother.” (Deuteronomy 15:7). 
 
“If there will be among you a needy person”:  [Meaning that t]he most needy person has 
priority… “in one of your cities:” [Meaning also that t]he poor of your city have priority 
over the poor of another city.  (Rashi commentary, emphasis added I.B.) 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
Since its nascence, moral philosophy has been haunted by the need to prioritize 
between aiding those in greatest need and fulfilling the needs of those more closely 
related to us.  This prioritization dilemma is even more important today, as global 
commercial relationships shrink our world into a global village where the answer to the 
question “Who is thy neighbor?” is less trivial than ever before.  The Article offers a new 
scholarly approach to how this question of prioritization should be addressed, and 
discusses the concrete implication of this approach on international trade policy, and, 
particularly, on international tax policy.  
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Startlingly, even though global markets operate in a world characterized by 
tremendous poverty and inequality—a world where 40% of people live on less than two 
dollars a day, legal literature dealing with international taxation rarely addresses issues of 
global distributive justice directly.  Unlike the domestic frontier, where legal scholars 
perceive the tax system as the key policy tool to promote redistribution,1 the legal 
scholarship is relatively silent on the tax system’s role in international redistribution.2  
This silence reflects upon a broader unresolved conflict in liberal political 
philosophy over the scope of distributive justice claims.  For the last four decades, 
philosophers have been engaged in a stagnated debate over whether considerations of 
distributive justice should be limited to the realms of the nation state.  Globalization—
that is, the growth of economic interconnectedness and interdependence among 
peoples—has forced this question out of the ivory tower, however.   
Real world dilemmas regarding our moral obligations to the distant poor and to 
questions of global inequality are increasingly becoming part of our everyday experience.  
We encounter them when we buy cheap consumer goods made abroad, when we invest 
our pension funds in multinational corporate enterprises (MNEs), and when we watch the 
news.  Global occurrences and trade issues also seem to occupy a growing role in the 
political agenda.  All of these daily experiences call upon moral political philosophy to 
devise the structure and guidelines for an international global economic regime that will 
balance our moral obligations to nearby compatriots with our obligations to needy 
foreigners.  Plainly put, globalization has placed the distant poor at our city gates so that 
turning aside the consequences of global poverty and inequality is no longer possible.3  
There are two general approaches in contemporary liberal political philosophy to 
questions of global distributive justice: Liberal-Cosmopolitanism and Liberal-Statism.  
Liberal-Cosmopolitans such as Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge argue that the notions 
that all humans are equal and that national endowment is a matter of pure luck prescribe 
that considerations of distributive justice should not be limited to the domestic realm.4  
Since every individual is a subject of equal moral concern, it is the liberal duty to 
establish political institutions that would allow every individual an opportunity to lead a 
decent autonomous life.  In sharp contrast, Liberal-Statists, such as Thomas Nagel, David 
Miller, and most notably John Rawls, argue that the claim for distributive justice is not 
based on common humanity but on the special associative relationship among 
compatriots.5  Individuals’ reciprocal and cooperative long-term political engagement 
with their compatriots, via the state, makes their national identity coincidental but not 
morally arbitrary.  The intimate and coercive nature of this arrangement justifies the 
                                                 
1 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules 
and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. Legal Stud. 821 6 (2000) 
2 These issues have been somewhat addressed by the political science literature. See generally Alexander 
W. Cappelen, The Moral Rationale for International Fiscal Law, 15 Ethics & International Affairs 97  
(2001) Thomas Rixen, Tax Competition and Inequality   (copy with the author) 
3 This is a paraphrase on the following expression “[Y]our transgressions are many and your sins are great, 
you who…turn aside the poor at the gate” (Amos 5:12).  
4 Charles R. Beitz, Justice and International Relations, 4 Philosophy & Public Affairs 360  (1975); Thomas 
W. Pogge, Realizing Rawls   (1989). 
5Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 Philosophy & Public Affairs 113  (2005); David Miller, 
Against Global Egalitarianism, 9 Journal of Ethics 55  (2005); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice   (1999); 
John Rawls, The Law of Peoples   (1999).  See also (making a somewhat similar point) Jack Goldsmith, 
Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55  Stan. L. Rev. 1667  (2003). 
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claim for distributive justice on the one hand; common humanity, on the other hand, 
gives rise only to claims of humanitarian assistance in times of crisis.  
The essence of the conflict between the two approaches is the inherent clash in 
liberalism between the notions of impartiality and (democratic) national sovereignty.  
Nationality is something most do not choose but rather are born into, and therefore 
favoring compatriots requires biased rules, which are antithetical to the common liberal 
intuition that fair moral standards should be general and universal.  However, as long as 
independent sovereign nation states comprise the world political system, global 
redistribution fundamentally conflicts with the notion of national sovereignty and 
accountability.  It does so because different sovereigns are each accountable only to their 
own people, they act independently from each other, and they may even act against each 
other.  Accordingly, no global redistribution is possible in the absence of an effective 
global political institution that governs how different peoples compete with each other.   
Simply put, in a world where North Korea may spend money without asking Japan for 
any authorization, and may indeed use it even to prepare for a war against Japan, the 
Japanese will not be willing to engage in any cross border redistribution of wealth—
regardless of North Koreans’ poverty and the reasons for it.  
The Liberal-Statist and Liberal-Cosmopolitan positions are distinct and 
dichotomous; therefore, the conflict over the scope of distributive justice claims is not 
likely to be resolved in the foreseeable future.  More fundamentally, both approaches fail 
to provide any guidance to policymakers operating in a hybrid global reality.  This reality 
does not align completely with either the Statist approach, because of the global market 
and its enhanced interconnectedness, or with the Cosmopolitan approach, because there 
are multiple state political entities operating independently. In the absence of such 
normative guidance, policymakers have only vague ideas of what political morality 
requires them to actually do.  The absence of a concrete agenda thus makes it difficult to 
internalize distributive considerations into the operation of international and supra-
national political institutions and to balance these considerations against other interests.  
More fundamentally, this lack of a concrete agenda suggests that there is a gap in the 
political philosophy discourse, which fails to reconcile individuals’ affinity towards 
compatriots with the notion that they should not concurrently be indifferent to questions 
of global poverty and inequality.  The current discourse within liberal political 
philosophy renders it impossible to translate these very real sentiments into a political 
framework.  The Article tries to fill this gap by offering an institutional analysis that 
evaluates how existing state-based international trade and tax institutions could be made 
to operate justly in terms of global wealth distribution.  But, it does not aim to “solve the 
world” by inventing alternative political institutions to replace the current international 
political system. 
The first objective of the Article is to advance the normative argument that it is 
not necessary to resolve the Liberal Statist v. Cosmopolitan debate to start thinking about 
what a more just allocation of global resources requires.  The global distributive justice 
debate can and should be bypassed by focusing on the way in which cross-border trade 
relationships affect our moral duties to foreigners.  I argue that international trade brings 
peoples from different countries materially closer and allows them to establish long-term 
economic relationships that once were limited to the local-domestic setting.  Once these 
relationships are set, they give rise to what I coin as “relational-distributive claims and 
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duties.”  The presence of these claims and duties helps to reconcile our moral distributive 
dilemma between our obligations to compatriots and to foreigners.  Although the moral 
and redistributive obligations towards compatriots are generally stronger than the 
relational duties towards foreigners producing the consumer goods one purchases, I 
suggest that the accelerated integration of global economy makes obligations to 
foreigners more tangible.   
I base my argument on three non-controversial assumptions: that human history is 
too complicated to allow historic rectification, that states will continue to exist,6 and that 
most individuals are concerned about issues of global poverty and inequality.  Using 
these assumptions, I examine the question of which actual relationships trigger claims 
and duties of redistribution.  Most relational duties, such as the duties between adult 
family members, prescribe ethical principles with regard to the morality of human 
behavior but do not typically require any external intervention of political institutions.    
The Article’s main theoretical contribution is the claim that these relational duties 
cause by globalization trigger distributive obligations towards foreigners and that these 
duties should affect the structure of international and supra-national institutions 
governing global trade.  I establish this claim by demonstrating that commercial 
relationships between peoples living in developed and developing countries may fall into 
an unfair pattern—meaning that individuals living in developed countries tend to benefit 
from global inequality and poverty in the developing world because of the frequent 
unfairness in market transactions between them.  Rather than developing a full theory of 
transactional fairness, I explain why these market transactions fall into categories that 
most people typically regard as immoral.  Even though both parties arguably benefit from 
voluntary transactions, they may be regarded as unfair if the benefits are unevenly 
skewed to one party because of the low bargaining power of the other party that results 
from an endowed vulnerability.  This concern is exacerbated when the vulnerable party 
has no real impact on the rules governing commercial interactions and when market 
returns do not allow that party to meet minimal decent life standards.  Unfortunately, this 
case often arises with international trade.  However, we should not conclude that 
engaging in global trade with developing countries is morally wrong, or that global trade 
harms individuals in developing countries.  The unfair pattern merely points out that 
long-term commercial relationships give rise to relational duties and that relationships 
taking place in an international setting are not fundamentally different from those in 
domestic settings.  Critics may argue that relational duties have nothing to do with 
redistribution but merely with reciprocal good conduct practices (e.g., the duty to enter a 
contract in good faith).  I, however, argue that in a reality in which global inequality and 
poverty considerably impact international trade’s allocation of benefits, “fair business 
conduct” compels parties to mitigate the impacts of the allocation in light of the 
seemingly inherent disadvantages of the vulnerable party.  
This unfair pattern is not a sign of moral faultiness but a systemic problem.  In a 
competitive market, individuals from developed countries have no alternative but to 
reduce their costs as much as they legally can.  This is therefore a classic common-action 
problem,7 in which market mechanisms prevent us from addressing the negative moral 
                                                 
6 Which entails a continuous adherence to favorable treatment of compatriots. 
7 The economic theory of public goods justifies common-action.  In its basic form, this theory suggests that 
the free market cannot efficiently supply these goods—e.g., national security and clean air—because they 
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externalities of our trade relationships with foreigners.  This common action problem 
justifies a political response, which assures that relational duties are met, or compensated 
for when breached.   
Addressing these relational duties requires restructuring the rules and institutions 
governing international trade.  As such, the second objective of the Article is to advance 
an institutional framework through which relational distributive duties could be met.  Put 
differently, the first objective is to identify the source of the redistributive duty; the 
second objective is to suggest some concrete measures that can help policymakers 
quantify and balance that duty with other considerations.  In this context, I suggest that 
international tax allocation arrangements are one appropriate way to accommodate these 
global relational redistributive duties.   
This proposal captures two important (and realistic) conceptual insights about 
what would be required from an effective and politically sustainable international 
distributive scheme: First, it requires transfers among states and cannot rely on the private 
or NGO sectors; and second, it requires some type of (commercial) relationship to trigger 
distributive claims and duties among peoples.  Because international tax law is an 
inherent part of every cross border transaction, the allocation of taxing rights could be 
used as an alternative to direct regulation of business practices thought to be unfair.  
Instead of decreasing international trade’s negative moral externalities by limiting 
business practice, the international tax regime (ITR)—which is the set of conventions that 
allocate the “right to levy tax” from commercial activities involving locations and/or 
residents from more than one jurisdiction—should include allocation conventions that 
compensate for those externalities by transferring wealth, in the form of taxing rights, to 
developing countries.  Accordingly, in the international context, the ITR should be 
understood as a macro price-correction mechanism that relies on the volumes of trade 
between given developed and developing countries as a proxy for the relational duties 
between their peoples.  I contextualize the analysis by briefly discussing how relational-
distributive duties impact the allocation of taxes between source and residence 
jurisdictions—a core issue in international income taxation.  I further point out that 
analyzing relational-distributive duties bears crucial significance on the most important 
ITR allocation challenge today—allocating income taxes derived from the activities of 
MNEs.   
An examination of both the legal-economic literature dealing with the ITR and the 
liberal philosophy literature dealing with international distributive justice reform reveals 
that with very few exceptions,8 the underlying relationship between ITR arrangements 
                                                                                                                                                 
are non-rivalrous and non-excludable.  Absent government action, these goods would go underprovided 
because of individuals’ rational tendency to free ride.  Rational individuals would therefore seek to 
establish institutions that would assure the provision of these public goods through obligatory common 
action.   
8 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 
Harv. L. Rev. 1537  (2000); Brian Barry, Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective, in Ethics, 
Economics, and the Law Nomos XXIV, 241-43, (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., XXXX).; 
Alexander W. Cappelen, National and International Distributive Justice in Bilateral Tax Treaties, 56 
Finanzarchiv 424  (1999 );Alexander W. Cappelen, The Moral Rationale for International Fiscal Law, 15 
Ethics & International Affairs 97  (2001); Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate 
Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 Tax L. Rev. 261  (2001); Charles R. Irish, 
International Double Taxation Agreements and Income Taxation at Source, 23 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 292  
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and different theories of global distributive justice has been largely neglected. Even 
though the domestic tax policy literature and the philosophic literature dealing with 
domestic redistribution identify the tax-and-spending system as the major redistributive 
policy device, there is hardly any reference to the ITR as an option to promote global 
wealth distribution.  Normative theories’ failure to include international fiscal policy in 
their analysis could be explained by the enormous complexity of tax laws.  
Understanding ITR rules and conventions involves exceptionally high learning costs, 
which are far less intuitive than the conventions underlying international trade law.  Tax 
scholars, on the other hand, find it difficult to engage in a normative discussion about the 
ITR given the multiple standards of welfare and redistribution that could be employed.9  
The way in which the Article approaches the issue of global wealth distribution 
deviates significantly from the traditional Cosmopolitan v. Statist debate.  It provides a 
normative framework that aligns well with prevalent moral intuitions that global 
inequality and poverty in the developing world matter but do not prevail over duties to 
compatriots.  More importantly, even though it offers no resolution for the moral 
dilemmas associated with the global distributive justice debate, it does offer a set of 
normative and policy conclusions through which realistic solutions could be developed 
and implemented.  It does so within the boundaries of existing global political reality 
where interaction among sovereign states is the underlying force shaping global order.  
This allows policymakers to overcome the failure of current political philosophy 
discourse to provide them with guidance.  Moreover, rather than engaging in the Liberal 
Cosmopolitan v. Statist debate, it urges philosophers and policymakers to establish a new 
discourse to determine which attributes in global trade trigger relational-distributive 
duties among peoples.  Such a discourse is necessary to provide a baseline for any future 
reform in the political structure governing international trade and the ITR.   
Part II describes the current liberal Cosmopolitan-Statist debate on global 
redistribution.  Part III explains the concept of relational duties and Part IV delineates the 
scope of the inquiry.  Part V explains why international trade results in relational duties 
between peoples living in developed and developing countries.  Part VI then discusses 
why the inability of the parties to address these relational duties invokes redistributive 
political justice questions.  Part VII offers the ITR as a viable mechanism to address these 
relational duties, by briefly explaining its current operation and structure and by 
analyzing how the “right to tax” should be allocated between developed (capital-





II.  The (Deadlocked) State of the Liberal Debate  
The conflict between liberal cosmopolitanism, which stresses the importance of 
global redistribution across-borders, and state-centered liberalism, which argues that 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1974); Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of International Income, 29 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 
145  (1998). 
9 Daniel N. Shaviro, Does More Sophisticated Mean Better? A Critique of Alternative Approaches to 
Sourcing the Interest Expense of U.S. Multinationals, 54 Tax L. Rev. 353  (2001) (relating to the difficult 
of making determinations about the appropriate welfare benchmark). 
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wealth redistribution should be limited to the politically accountable unit of the nation 
state, is decades old.  Rather than exploring each of these positions in great depth, this 
Article seeks to explain why no convincing theory has yet been able to reconcile these 
opposing views.  Independently, both Liberal-Cosmopolitanism and Liberal-Statism 
approaches are appealing and intuitive in some respects, but they are also materially 
deficient in others.  The inability to bridge the two sides has incapacitated further 
evolution of the debate.  As a result, liberal political philosophy has not equipped 
policymakers with the tools necessary to address global redistribution issues, even though 
there is a general sense that global poverty and inequality are a source of moral concern.  
Indeed, clarifying the normative debate over global redistribution is the most important 
challenge faced by contemporary political philosophy today because it would allow 
distributive justice considerations to influence the development of international and 
supranational institutions.   
 
A.  Two Worlds on One Planet 
Details over third world poverty and world inequality are readily available in the 
information bombarded developed world.  The details themselves, whether conveyed in 
sensational coverage of dire human tragedies or statistical figures, are shocking—
revealing huge human suffering.10  In 2005, about 40% of the worlds population lived on 
below $2 per day, child mortality in Sub-Saharan countries was about thirty times higher 
than in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) countries 
and maternity mortality rate is fifty times higher in the developing world than in the 
developed world.11  These statistics as well as many others, can only give us, the 
privileged residents of the developed world, a vague idea of the pervasiveness of extreme 
poverty and the imminent hardship associated with it.  
That the above figures are (or at least should be) a source of moral discomfort to 
well-off individuals in developed countries is fairly uncontested.  Moreover, it is not 
relevant to this analysis whether this moral discomfort originates from the fact that much 
of the human suffering is a direct result of past injustices (e.g., colonization, slavery) or 
that it could easily be avoided (e.g., infant mortality from preventable diseases), or 
whether it stems from a “feeling” that all human beings are equal in some important ways 
and should not be born into a life of misery.  What is relevant, however, is that this moral 
discomfort is widespread and real.   
                                                 
10 Shaohua Chen & Martin Ravallion, Absolute Poverty Measures for the Developing World, 1981-2004 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4211 at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/04/16/000016406_200704161040
10/Rendered/PDF/wps4211.pdf. 
11 All the data is collected from the web cite of the World Bank.  The data reflects figures for the year 2005. 
This means that the estimates do not reflect the potentially large impact of rising food and fuel prices in 
recent year—which have most likely increased poverty measures in the developing world. See Who, et al., 
Maternal Mortality in 2005 16  (2007); World Bank, Data on Poverty and Inequality--Overview. at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,,contentMDK:20153
855~menuPK:435040~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:430367,00.html.; World Bank, HNPstats. 
at http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers.. 
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Human poverty is hardly new.  In fact, in relative terms, it has declined during the 
last decade.12  The focus of this Article’s inquiry is the changes that have occurred in the 
socio-political frameworks in which global poverty or inequality exist, and on the moral 
impact of these changes.   
The post-Cold War establishment of open and liberalized global markets appeared 
to be the ultimate triumph of western ideology.  It also created the impression, however, 
that nation states may no longer be able to take care of their poor citizens when faced 
with pressures of a world economy governed by strict neoliberal conventions.   
This concern is aggravated by the fact that world markets operate at an 
accelerated pace, as technological advancements allow people to transfer commodities, 
capital, and information much more quickly and reliably than ever before.  One aspect of 
this advancement, that typically goes unnoticed, is that technological advancements have 
also made it possible to effectively distribute commodity surpluses and wealth among 
nations and peoples, perhaps for the first time in human history.  Hence, the 
unprecedented wealth produced by global markets highlights how little has been done (in 
comparison to what could be done) to use this wealth to reduce human misery in the 
developing world.  
Nevertheless, the widespread moral discomfort with global poverty and inequality 
has not resulted in any agreement as to how to mitigate them.  The new technological 
option of materially mitigating global poverty and inequality has, however, intensified 
debates in contemporary liberal political philosophy about these issues.13   
Liberalism emerged from Kantian moral philosophy, which considers all 
individuals as equal moral agents.  In the political context, the notion of equal moral 
worthiness prescribes that individuals should not be treated differently by political 
institutions because of factors they do not control (e.g., gender, race) or attributes that are 
part of their personal lives (e.g., religion, sexual orientation).  Furthermore, in the second 
half of the twentieth century, liberal philosophers have extended this idea to argue that 
the notion of equal moral worthiness prescribes that individuals should not be put at a 
relative disadvantage because of things beyond their control.14  There is of course great 
controversy over what comprises acts of will and what is pure luck,15 and whether the 
state should be responsible for offering equal opportunity or just sufficient opportunities 
to all,16 but the basic idea is relatively appealing and intuitive.  From a liberal 
perspective, individuals are equal moral agents, and they should be able to have a fair 
opportunity to lead a meaningful and autonomous life regardless of the race, class and 
religious groups they we 17re born into.    
                                                 
12 World Bank, Data on Poverty and Inequality--Overview. at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,,contentMDK:20153
855~menuPK:435040~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:430367,00.html. 
13 As the references below reveal the vast majority of the literature dealing with this issue has been written 
in the last ten years. 
14 Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 469 476 (2007) 
(providing a thoughtful summary of this literature); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality Part 2: Equality of 
Resources, 10 Philosophy and Public Affairs 283  (1981). 
15 Id. 
16 Harry Frankfurt, Equality as a Moral Idea, 98 Ethics 21  (1987). 
17 Technically, nationality religion and even sex are mutable categories.  However, de facto, for the vast 
majority of humanity changing these categories is not really a viable option and therefore the Article will 
treat these categories as immutable.  
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In the context of this article, the debate over global distributive justice produced 
two camps within liberal political philosophy: Cosmopolitanism and Statism.   
 
B.  Cosmopolitanism 
Contemporary Liberal-Cosmopolitan philosophers argue that policymakers should 
abandon current state-centered redistribution conceptions in favor of a more position that 
does not distinguish among individuals by their nationality.18  While these cosmopolitan 
philosophers may be trailblazing vanguards or prisoners of their ivory-towers, their 
monist claims— that the only units of moral concern are human beings, and that all 
human beings are morally equal and should be treated accordingly19—are forceful and 
deserve addressing.   
Liberal-Cosmopolitans evaluate political institutions in accordance with how 
promote those institutions regard all human beings.20  This moral evaluation 
encompasses two important stages marking the development of contemporary Liberal-
Cosmopolitan philosophy, each of which was triggered by the works of the influential 
philosopher John Rawls and the feeling among Liberal-Cosmopolitans that his works do
not sufficiently take into account issues of global inequality and poverty.  In his land






                                                
21 Rawls reshaped liberal thought, claiming that the 
operation of just institutions are those agreed upon by rational individuals positioned 
behind the “veil of ignorance.”  The veil of ignorance is a thought experiment—in whi
individuals are thought to have no information whatsoever about their actual positio
possible positions, and their probabilities.  It is therefore a method designed to av
particularity from shaping political institutions, and it relies on the reasoning of 
hypothetical agents that are forced to be impartial by their ignorance.  From this thought 
experiment, Rawls derived his famous two general principles of justice—the liberty and 
difference principles—which require the protection of basic liberties and the equitable 
provision of five primary goods.22  Although a deep analysis and critique of the Rawlsian 
theory goes well beyond the scope of this inquiry, it is important to note that in “A 
Theory of Justice,” Rawls constrains his principles of justice to the political unit of the 
nation state and remains intentionally brief and vague as to why he does so.23   
The first stage of Liberal-Cosmopolitanism challenged this confinement of the 
Rawlsian analysis to the nation state political unit.24  Philosophers like Charles Beitz and 
Thomas Pogge have claimed that the Rawlsian assumption that domestic political 
institutions operate as a closed system that distributes fundamental rights and duties 
conflicts with reality.  In reality, individuals’ access to fundamental rights is also affected 
 
18 Among the recent influential works of Liberal Cosmopolitans one can include: Thomas Pogge, World 
Poverty and Human Rights, 19 Ethics & International Affairs 1  (2005); Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without 
Borders – Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Patriotism   (2004 ). 
19 Charles Beitz, Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice, 9 Journal of Ethics 11  (2005) ; Andrea 
Sangiovanni, Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State, 35 Philosophy & Public Affairs 3  (2007) 
20 They do not (explicitly) tie the cosmopolitan ideal to the existence of a global state, however.  See Kok-
Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders – Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Patriotism 5  (2004 ). 
21 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 40-168  (1999)  
22 Rawls defines the primary goods as goods “every rational person is presumed to want” whatever else he 
wants, including liberty opportunities, wealth, income and the social bases for self respect. Id. at 54   
23 Id. at 6-8   
24 The constitutive works of Liberal Cosmopolitans at this stage are: Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and 
International Relations   (1979); Thomas W. Pogge, Realizing Rawls   (1989). 
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by the interactions among states, market forces, and international mechanisms over which 
the state sometimes has little or no influence (e.g., supra-national institutions or 
foreigners participating in the domestic economy as investors).25  Accordingly, Liberal-
Cosmopolitans argue that, to be faithful to its own principles, Rawls’s theory should 
adhere to its liberal individualistic framework.  This framework should disregard national 
borders as no more than an arbitrary distinction and looks only at individuals.26  Because 
individuals are born into their nationality, their “national endowments” are morally 
arbitrary and the veil of ignorance should extend so that rational agents making decisions 
behind it would not be aware of them.  If this was to happen, the Rawlsian framework 
itself would prescribe that just political institutions would apply the two principles of 
justice to all human beings.27  This extension of Rawlsian distributive theory thus sets a 
high universal standard and requires mass transfers of resources from developed to 
developing countries.   
The second stage in Liberal-Cosmopolitan thought emerged as a reaction to 
Rawls’s later book—“The Law of Peoples” in which he explicitly addressed, and 
rejected, an extension of his distributive theory to the international arena.  Rawls 
acknowledged that all individuals are entitled to have their basic humanitarian needs met, 
especially in times of crises in which states may not be able to supply even minimally 
acceptable levels of basic provisions.28  These humanitarian-rescue duties that people 
have towards other peoples, which he framed as “the duty of assistance,” differ from the 
domestic distributive obligations triggered by inequality.  In response, Pogge published a 
collection of essays in which he re-articulated the notion of global redistribution duties,29 
which had a broader and more tangible appeal than the initial classical Liberal-
Cosmopolitan argument.  He argued that even from a minimalistic libertarian perspective, 
peoples of developed nations have a duty not to harm those in developing nations.  He 
then demonstrated how existing international arrangements actually harm peoples of 
developing countries.  This includes anti-dumping arrangements, agricultural subsidies 
and intellectual property regulatory regimes all which favor the interest of developed 
countries at the expense of perpetuating the disadvantages and humanitarian deficits of 
less-developed countries and reducing the welfare of their citizens.  From an empirical 
perspective, many of Pogge’s claims are counterfactual and have been persuasively 
criticized as speculative.30  Some of his other claims are, nevertheless, well established.  
For example, the international legal system harms people of developing countries when 
                                                 
25 Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations 144-47,  166  (1979); Thomas W. Pogge, 
Realizing Rawls 219  (1989) 
26 Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 53-54  (1979); Thomas W. Pogge, 
Realizing Rawls 247  (1989). 
27 Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations 138-140, 151-152, 164  (1979); Thomas 
W. Pogge, Realizing Rawls 240-44  (1989) 
28 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 113-20  (1999). Rawls argues that the underlying motivation behind 
this Rawls’s position is his notion of tolerance and the idea that peoples should not be required to adopt a 
liberal regime.  Once different types of legitimate regimes are present in the international arena, each 
regime should be allowed to pursue its own objectives, and, should be held accountable to them.   
29 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms   (Polity. 
2002). For a summary of the arguments made in the book see Thomas Pogge, Real World Justice, 9 Journal 
of Ethics 29  (2005). 
30 Mathias Risse, How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor? , 33 Philosophy and Public Affairs 349  
(2005). 
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protecting the resource and borrowing privileges of tyrant and corrupt governments and 
holding the state liable to agreements made by those governments.  The willingness of 
Western governments and business entities to collaborate with these governments 
constitutes a casual relation to the misery of the people of corrupt governments.  
It is, however, difficult to draw a cause-and-effect connection between the 
privileges of the developed countries and the actual harm they inflicted on developing 
countries.31  For example, should the citizens of the United States, Britain, Ireland, Israel, 
and Finland all be considered as preventing or causing harm when the International 
Monetary Fund (“IMF”) (along with other financial conglomerates) agreed to bail out 
South Korea during the 1998 East Asia financial crisis but refused to do the same later 
with Argentina?  Should they be considered as harming peoples of developing countries 
when western financial institutions lend money to developing countries, or when they 
refuse to do so?  Should they be considered as causing or preventing harm when those 
banks forgive some, but not all, of the debt owed to them by developing countries (e.g., 
the case of Argentina)?  These questions demonstrate how limited Pogge’s theory is in 
providing guidelines to construct actual global redistributive policies.  In other words, 
Pogge’s ideas of rectification fail to provide any practical guidance as to how much 
redistribution should there be, and more importantly, they do not help identify what 
occurrences trigger a distributive duty. 
Pogge made clear that he regarded his later proposal—that there is a minimal duty 
not to harm—as a second-best alternative for explaining distributive duties.  The best 
alternative, in his opinion, was still the original argument: that the ultimate duty to 
redistribute wealth from developed to developing nations is anchored in a positive duty to 
account for the equal moral importance of individuals.32  This duality in Pogge’s position 
highlights the main contribution of his normative innovation.  In his later work, Pogge 
shifted the Liberal-Cosmopolitan ambition to avenues more compatible with individuals’ 
ordinary perceptions.  Rather than advocating for an all-or-nothing solution—which 
stresses complete moral equality between compatriots and foreigners—he emphasized the 
presence of a preliminary duty not to harm other humans (or to compensate for the harm 
one has inflicted).  Focusing on the alleged harm inflicted by the current system on 
peoples of developing countries, Pogge reframed the obligations towards them as 
negative duties (duties not to harm) and, by doing so, appealed to a broader audience.  
For Pogge, a devoted Liberal-Cosmopolitan, this reframing came at the cost of 
significantly narrowing peoples’ duties to only include remedying casually linked 
disadvantages.  Therefore, he essentially adopted his second-best reality proposal: 
peoples living in developed countries would not have to allocate resources to mitigate the 
disadvantages they did not cause—no matter how devastating their consequences may be 
(e.g., the AIDS epidemic in Africa).  He, therefore, paved the way to a new non-utopian 
philosophic discourse over global distributive justice issues that promotes arguments 
other than the merits of complete and unconditional equality between foreigners and 
                                                 
31 See generally  Alan Patten, Should We Stop Thinking about Poverty in Terms of Helping the Poor?, 19 
Ethics & International Affairs 19  (2005); Mathias Risse, Do We Owe the Global Poor Assistance or 
Rectification?, 19 Ethics & International Affairs 9  (2005). 
32 Thomas Pogge, A Cosmopolitan Perspective on the Global Economic Order, in The Political Philosophy 
of Cosmopolitanism 93-95, (Gillian Brock & Harry Brighouse eds., 2005).; Debra Satz, What Do We Owe 
the Global Poor?, 19 Ethics & International Affairs 47  (2005). 
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compatriots.  Moreover, by trying to win broader appeal, Pogge opened a discourse that 
takes into account common perceptions as a relevant consideration in the global 
distributive justice moral debate. 
For Liberal-Cosmopolitans, globalization did not change anything.  It just made 
the attempt to assign moral value to states more evidently absurd.  Given the strong 
commitment of liberal scholarship to notions of moral equality, impartiality, and 
adequate opportunity to all—how can any liberal possibly differentiate between 
individuals according to their nationality?  How can a liberal political arrangement 
possibly exclude itself from addressing tremendous human suffering and lack of 
meaningful opportunities simply because it involves the bad fortune of individuals who 
happened to be born in foreign nations? 
The notion that moral equality gives rise to the belief that all humans are entitled 
to some equal provision of certain basic goods cannot, however, be separated from the 
question of what global political regime should enforce and supervise this provision.  
Most Liberal-Cosmopolitans try to avoid linking the Liberal-Cosmopolitan ideal to the 
global state concept.  Even though they do not call to abolish states, they tend to remain 
intentionally (and suspiciously) vague about the actual mechanism through which global 
distribution should be enforced.  This, undoubtedly, is Liberal-Cosmopolitanism’s 
Achilles heel. 
 
C.  Statism 
Liberal-Statists are at an inherent philosophic disadvantage when confronted with 
Liberal-Cosmopolitans’ critique.  Given the strong commitment of liberal thought for 
moral equality, impartiality, and the right of all individuals for an opportunity to conduct 
a meaningful life, how can one morally justify the political structure of nation states and 
their bias towards compatriots? 
Most Liberal-Statist philosophers would agree that a moral political structure 
would have for account to foreigners’ common humanity.33  They contend, however, that 
common humanity can only justify wealth transfers and interventions on a rescue basis—
when foreigners suffer from absolute deprivation of human autonomy and dignity.  This 
common humanity is insufficient to trigger robust redistributive obligations aimed at 
reducing relative deprivation caused by inequality, however.  Liberal-Statists argue that 
the existence of collaborative political institutions, which also have the coercive power to 
force actions on their members, fundamentally alters the connection among individuals, 
and that distributive justice claims only arise in the context of this unique association, 
which is based on mutual commitment.34  A detailed inquiry into the subtleties of the 
above position is unnecessary, because all of us experience it on a daily basis; for 
example, we are aware of famines, but endorse the political reality in which providing 
costly medication to Medicaid recipients has priority over providing food to distant 
foreigners.     
                                                 
33 Michael Blake, Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy, 30 Philosophy & Public Affairs 257  
(2001) 
34Id. at ;  David Miller, Against Global Egalitarianism, 9 Journal of Ethics 55  (2005);  
Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 Philosophy & Public Affairs 113  (2005); Andrea 
Sangiovanni, Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State, 35 Philosophy & Public Affairs 3  (2007) 
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Thinking of nationality in terms of commitment is appealing but problematic.  
Nationality is formalistic and, in most cases, an involuntary association.  Why should an 
American of Mexican descent living north of the Rio Grande be committed to help 
finance wealth transfers and government services to American citizens that live on the 
other side of the Mississippi River or the Atlantic Ocean? Would it not be more plausible 
to assume a stronger commitment between this particular American citizen and her 
Mexican neighbors on the south bank of the river? 
Liberal-Statists have a multilayer reply to this critique.  First, they point out that 
in many instances national group memberships correlate relatively well with other group 
memberships based on similar historic, ethnic, cultural and linguistic backgrounds.  
Second, the notion that all individuals are entitled to certain universal rights does not 
mean that the burden (of the positive duties) to assure those rights falls equally on all 
human beings.35  Any type of reasonable political theory would have to account for the 
fact that individuals have stronger obligations towards others that have reciprocal 
obligations towards them.  Even though the act of entry into a nation is pure luck, once 
membership is established, it is accompanied by reciprocal rights and obligations.  Most 
individuals live their lives in ways that suggest they accept that the reciprocal relationship 
among them and their fellow compatriots carries significant moral weight.36  Regardless 
of whether Liberal-Cosmopolitans regard this as right or wrong, this tendency of human 
nature is something of which (non-utopian) political philosophy should take into account.   
More importantly, despite the recent wave of globalization, world markets and the 
international organizations that help coordinate and regulate their operations have not 
come close to replacing the role of the state.  Although this may change over time, 
contemporary international markets and political settings do not exercise the same level 
of control over individuals’ lives—they lack coercive power and have no effective 
mechanism to directly assign personal claims or duties.   
Each country has to take into consideration the policies of other governments but 
is accountable to its own people; thus it determines by itself which policies it wants to 
pursue.  In this type of political setting, the attempt to establish a global safety net 
through cross-national redistribution is bound to be ineffective and, in many cases, will 
lead to politically absurd and unsustainable results.  Two points stand out about 
cooperative redistributive enterprises that are formulated and driven at the nation-state 
level. First, to be effective, a redistributive enterprise requires cooperation among 
participating governments and a minimal level of competence in governments receiving 
aid.37  Second, and more importantly, the notion of national self-government and 
accountability is inconsistent with the ideals of cosmopolitan egalitarianism.38  This is 
because governments’ policies reflect, to a certain extent, the preferences of their 
                                                 
35 Henry Shue, Mediating Duties, 98 Ethics 687  (1988); David Miller, Cosmopolitanism: A Critique, 5 
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 80  (2002).  See also Andrew Mason, 
Special Obligations to Compatriots, 107 Ethics 427  (1997) (providing an interesting account for what the 
concept of citizenship should mean to justify these obligations). 
36 David Miller, National Responsibility and International Justice, in The Ethics of Assistance 124, (Deen 
K. Chatterjee ed., 2004). 
37 Mathias Risse, What We Owe to the Global Poor, 9 Journal of Ethics 81  (2005) 
38 David Miller, Against Global Egalitarianism, 9 Journal of Ethics 55  (2005) 
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peoples—so each people should bear the consequences of its policies.39  Cosmopolitan 
egalitarianism thus undermines national accountability because it requires people from 
one political entity to transfer funds to other peoples, which are subject to political 
institutions over which they have no influence.  
The above concern is not a theoretical deficiency, but a fundamental practical-
political obstacle that makes any international redistribution inherently unsustainable.  
For example, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Syria are countries in conflict with each other.  
Assume, solely for the purpose of this example, that all three nations have democratically 
elected governments that reflect their peoples' will.  Any claim for cosmopolitan 
distributive justice would require disregarding that conflict, and have Israel and Saudi 
Arabia transfer funds to Syria, which is by far the poorest of the three countries.  Even if 
Syria would have been required to use these funds only to improve its provision of 
healthcare services, the transfers from Israel and Saudi Arabia would still leave it with 
more resources to better prepare for a future conflict with them.  This is politically 
unsustainable.  No Israeli or Saudi government could agree or persuade their voters to 
support such a redistributive scheme, and no Syrian government could ever have this 
claim enforced.  Significantly, this problem is inherent in any cosmopolitan redistributive 
scheme; because money is fungible, it could not be corrected by having Israel and Saudi-
Arabia make transfers to an international organization that would then allocate it to Syria 
and other less-developed countries.  Accordingly, if developed countries were forced to 
make transfers to such an organization, the United States and the United Kingdom could 
indirectly help countries such as North Korea, Belarus, and Zimbabwe.  By doing so, they 
would take off some of the economic burden from those governments and, in a sense, 
indirectly subsidize their policies. 
Liberal-Cosmopolitans may argue that (relatively) affluent Israelis have indeed 
cosmopolitan duties of wealth redistribution to (relatively) poor Syrians.  They would 
probably concede, however, that Israelis are not required to transfer funds to Syrians but 
would argue this does not mean that the cosmopolitan duties do not exist, but merely that 
they are trumped by (national and personal) security considerations.40  While there is no 
controversy that, by the virtue of their common humanity, Syrians and Israelis owe 
humanitarian duties to each other,41 the notion that they have redistributive duties is not 
only meaningless—because they currently can not be met—but also are counter-intuitive.  
By the same token, those Liberal-Cosmopolitans would have to endorse that (relatively) 
affluent American Jews had redistributive duties towards poor Germans in 1943, and that 
(relatively) rich Tutsis living at Burundi had distributive duties towards poorer Hutus 
living in the neighboring Rwanda during the 1994 genocide.   
The above two, admittedly extreme and provocative, examples illustrate a deeper 
point, however. Statists’ objection to global redistribution is deeply rooted in the well 
established notion within contemporary liberal political philosophy that questions of 
justice, and distributive justice, can only be meaningfully addressed in a beyond-crisis 
                                                 
39 Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others – Aliens, Residents and Citizens 103 & 112  (2004); David Miller, 
National Responsibility and International Justice, in The Ethics of Assistance 124, (Deen K. Chatterjee ed., 
2004).. 
40 I thank David Pozen for bringing this forceful objection to my attention. 
41 E.g., those duties imposed under the Geneva conventions, which provide citizens and soldiers of enemy 
countries with some minimal set of rights under the law of war.   
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social setting.  Only a society which assures a certain sustainable level of personal safety 
and political stability, and where no large-scale conflict or famine exists, can “afford” to 
develop just political institutions.42  Accordingly, states’ sovereignty and accountability 
to their own peoples undermine the notion of long term international stability, and, 
indeed, the international arena has for many years been considered as a Hobbesian “State 
of Nature.”43 Although world history may, hopefully, be progressing to a much more 
peaceful era, state sovereignty still imposes a challenge to cross border redistribution.  
For example, Germans living in the West side of the Berlin wall probably felt very close 
to those living on its east side, but mass redistribution between them became possible 
only once the conflict between East and West Germany ended.  
This example demonstrates why redistribution on the international level is very 
different from domestic redistribution.  Even in the case of countries like the United 
States—which are comprised of fifty smaller semi-autonomous political units—federal 
supervision helps to overcome problems of competence, cooperation and conflict.  People 
in Massachusetts may have very different opinions than those living in Texas, and this 
may indeed lead them to structure their local and political affairs differently.  However, 
despite all their differences, wealthy individuals living in Massachusetts would likely be 
much more willing to comply with a federal redistributive program benefiting poor 
Texans than Israelis would be willing to comply with a program benefiting Syrians.  It is 
not only that Texas will not use this money to disadvantage Massachusetts in the same 
way Syria may use it against Israel, but also that people in Massachusetts know that, at a 
time of national crisis, Texans would be responsible for cooperating with them to 
alleviate the source of the crisis.  It is therefore apparent that humanity is not enough, and 
that a long-term reciprocal commitment is required to trigger a viable political 
distributive justice claim in a multi-state political reality.  
Given the above, most Liberal-Statists would agree that the Liberal-Cosmopolitan 
vision is a utopian ideal—desired, yet unachievable.  In a world divided into different 
national apparatuses, no cosmopolitan egalitarian scheme is possible.  Many Liberal-
Cosmopolitans would be forced to agree to this proposition, but would reply with another 
quandary: what does it mean to be a liberal and to recognize that all human beings are of 
equal moral worth if de facto significant numbers of human beings do not deserve any 
material consideration because they are foreigners?  If by the virtue of their humanity, 
those foreigners are entitled to some rights that they are not receiving from their own 
state, who has the duty to assure that these rights are provided?  How can foreigners’ 
rights mean anything if no one has an effective correlative duty to assure it is provided?  
How can a bias towards compatriots be reconciled with the Kantian position that all 
humans are of equal moral worth?  How can we justify the moral waste that occurs when 
developed countries invest enormous amounts in their own citizens when it is much 
cheaper to alleviate foreigners’ right deficiencies?44 
 
                                                 
42 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 5-6  (1999) 
43 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 63  (1651) 
44 These questions demonstrate how the Cosmopolitan Statist debate within liberalism echoes on another 
fundamental debate within liberalism between equality and autonomy. Sovereignty could be seen as a form 
of autonomy and therefore there is an inherent conflict between it and arguments for equality. I thank Alon 
Harel for sharing this insight with me.  
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D.  Identifying the Problem: Global Poverty in the Crossroad of Two Conflicting Liberal 
Intuitions 
Rather than adding another argument to the Statist-Cosmopolitan debate, this 
Article tries to identify the source of the controversy.  It claims that the controversy 
originates from the two conflicting intuitions that emerge out of liberal thought: the 
intuition that rules should be impartial and the intuition that the liberal ideal could only 
be reasonably achieved within the framework of the nation state, which is based on past 
historic experience and analytical thinking.45  As I explain below, these two intuitions are 
key to understanding how political institutions and moral arguments are framed in liberal 
democracies. 
Modern liberal theory requires political arrangements to be just, so that all 
rational individuals will agree to them.46  This requires liberal arguments to be impartial.  
Impartiality, as a methodological tool, validates the legitimacy of rules because it ensures 
that their application is general and is not contingent on morally arbitrary factors (e.g., 
race, gender, religion).47  For this reason, partiality is often considered as a proxy for 
injustice, because individuals should be held accountable for their actions and, to a 
certain degree, their preferences but should not be disadvantaged due to things beyond 
their control.  Thus, there is a strong bias in liberal thought against any distinction based 
on endowment that is considered partial and unjust. 
Even though liberalism is committed to impartiality, it also inherently relates to 
the notion of democratic sovereignty.  In liberalism, the premise that all humans carry 
equal moral weight suggests that democracy, in which every person has an equal 
opportunity to vote and influence public policy, is the practical political structure 
according to which individuals’ claims from society and responsibilities to it should be 
determined.  There is also a historic connection between liberalism and democracy; 
liberalism developed in Western Europe during roughly the same period that national 
ideologies and nation-states developed there.48  Thus, to date, democratic sovereignty has 
only been effectively exercised within the nation-state’s political framework—that is, 
only democratic nation-states have been able to execute policies that endorse liberal 
values, e.g., legal regimes that protect human rights and tax-spending policies that 
sponsor welfare state provisions.49  In contrast, very few Liberal-Cosmopolitans argue 
                                                 
45 This claim that the international arena cannot provide a stable political framework could be traced to 
Hobbes. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 63  (1651) (stating “ yet in all time kings, and persons of 
sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies and in the state and posture 
of gladiators)”. 
46 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 3-6, 10-15, 47-52  (1999) 
47 Robert Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable 1  (1985) 
48 See generally Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism 140-50  (Princeton University Press. 1993).  
49 Mark Beeson, Globalisation, the State and Economic Justice: Paper for Ethics and Australian Foreign 
Policy, Symposium at the University of 
Queensland,   9 (2003); Wilfred L. David, The Humanitarian Development Paradigm Search for Global 
Justice 241  (2004 );  David Miller, The Ethical Significance of Nationality, 98 Ethics 647  (1988) 
(claiming that “[t]he universalist case for nationality, therefore, is that it creates communities with the 
widest feasible membership, and therefore with the  greatest scope for redistribution in favor of the needy.  
Smaller units would be hampered by their limited resource base; wider units, although advantageous for the 
reverse reason, would be unable to generate a distributive consensus”).  See also Robert E. Goodin, What is 
So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?, 98 Ethics 663  (1988) (arguing that “Territorial boundaries are 
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that a world democracy would be an optimal arrangement—precisely because they fear 
that these characteristics can only be achieved within nation-state frameworks.50 
The cleft between these intuitions is straightforward and inevitable because 
nationality, like race, is in many ways an arbitrary category.  When liberals restrict the 
obligation for justice on the basis of nationality, they undertake a partial position based 
on national endowment.51  This partiality would have been morally insignificant in a 
world in which every national entity was able to supply its members with an adequate set 
of minimal resources to lead a meaningful autonomous life.52  It has enormous 
consequences, however, in our world, in which sovereigns vary considerably in their 
capacity and willingness to provide for all of their citizens.  In this world, partiality 
towards compatriots means that developed countries primarily devote their resources to 
promoting the welfare of poor living in them.  This leaves the poor living in developing 
countries—which is roughly half of the human race—in a heavily constrained position.53   
 
E. Why Deadlock? 
Recognizing the sources of the conflict between liberal intuitions of impartiality 
and national democratic sovereignty is more important than determining the 
persuasiveness of the Liberal-Statist or Liberal-Cosmopolitan positions.  The difficulty in 
reconciling these two notions is crucial because it leads to a policy deadlock.  This 
conclusion may surprise some readers, given the unprecedented recent flourish of the 
philosophic literature dealing with issues of global distributive justice and given that 
political philosophy is not a field in which one would expect to find unanimous 
concurrence.  
The argument of a deadlock in the current political debate relates to the inability 
of both the Liberal-Cosmopolitan and Liberal-Statist approaches to inform actual policies 
related to current practices of international relations and commerce.  Both sides offer 
dichotomous arguments that are not only parallel to one another, but also to policymakers 
who need to form these political institutions in a multi-state economically integrated 
global arena.   
For example, Statists like Nagel, may feel that the way current World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) trade liberalization initiatives exclude agriculture unfairly 
disadvantages developing countries.  However, given their State-centric position, they 
would be unable to ground their criticism to any obligation which requires developed 
countries to “give up” their superior bargaining positions to better promote the interests 
of developing countries.  Cosmopolitans would not be able to provide policymakers with 
any guidance on how to design those political institutions as well.  Obviously, from a 
                                                                                                                                                 
merely useful devices for "matching" one person to one protector.  Citizenship is merely a device for fixing 
special responsibility in some agent for discharging our general duties vis-a-vis each particular person”). 
50 There is a general fear that a global world regime would not be able to produce efficient decision making 
mechanisms and would oppress minority groups. See also Jack Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and 
Cosmopolitan Duty, 55  Stan. L. Rev. 1667  (2003) (making this point brilliantly).  
51 Alasdair Macintyre, Is Patriotism a Virtue? 5  (1984 ) 
52 Goodin (arguing that restricting the right for justice to the national sphere is justified when it could be 
perceived as a geographic division of labor in which, instead of having one world government that assumes 
responsibility for all humanity, comprehensive coverage is achieved when every sovereign assumes 
responsibility for its members). 
53 See supra note 11. 
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cosmopolitan perspective, more distribution is better than no distribution, but 
international institutions play only an instrumental role.  There is nothing inherent in 
trade or tax relationships requiring that cosmopolitan redistribution be promoted through 
them.  Cosmopolitans would thus agree on any type of redistributive scheme that would 
be politically feasible and have the most redistributive outcome—whether it is lump-sum 
payments between sovereigns, trade agreements or tying $100 bills to migrating birds.   
The impact of the mismatch between the discourse of political philosophy and 
what is actually at stake cannot be underestimated.  Both approaches engage in 
speculative normative theory—while remaining relatively mute about the evolving 
institutional framework of international and supranational institutions.  That both 
approaches have so little to say about current policy issues suggests an ambition to 
provide the perfect solution.  In this type of discourse it is no wonder that many actual 
issues associated with the construction of current arrangements fly under the radar of 
moral-political scrutiny.  Without undermining the role of ideal theory, the inability of 
political philosophy to seize this window of opportunity to impact the actual construction 
of global arrangements suggests a troubling deadlock.   
This Article follows this conclusion of deadlock.  Rather than embracing or 
rejecting either the Liberal-Cosmopolitan or Liberal-Statist approach, it considers 
whether there are  other ways to approach global distributive issues and to tackle the 
conflicting moral intuitions of impartiality and the necessity of the nation state. 
 
III.  Changing the Framework: From Impartial Justice to Relational Duties 
This Article suggests a different approach through which the commitment of 
peoples living in developed countries to those living in developing countries should be 
examined.  In presenting this approach, two additional concepts should first be carefully 
explained and distinguished: impartial justice and relational duties.  Impartial justice is 
the set of claims and duties among certain group members, which are independent from 
individuals’ actual relationships.  Relational duties are partial and based on particular 
obligations agents owe to those with whom they choose to associate.  The framework of 
this Article relies on a novel concept of relational distributive duties.  To best understand 
this concept, one has to carefully examine how it stands apart from the global distributive 
justice debate reviewed in Part II. 
 
A.  Impartial Distributive Justice  
I argue that the controversy between Liberal-Cosmopolitans and Liberal-Statists 
should best be understood as a controversy about the scope of impartial distributive 
justice.  Standards of distributive justice are typically impartial in the sense that they 
apply to all members of a designated group and do not depend upon the existence of 
actual relationships among group members.  These standards may require individuals to 
transfer resources even to complete strangers.  In the context of impartial distributive 
justice, actual relationships do not weaken or strengthen the distributive duty or claim.54   
                                                 
54 These impartial distributive justice claims are manifested in the domestic tax-spending systems of liberal 
democracies.  In those systems high income taxpayers are required to pay taxes that indirectly finance 
transfers to low income taxpayers—regardless of whether they are the poor family relatives or the worst 
high school enemies of the high income taxpayers. 
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Hence, the Liberal-Cosmopolitan-Statist controversy is about impartial 
distributive justice because it centers on the question of which group justice 
considerations should be imposed.  Liberal-Statists consider the group of citizens or 
residents to comprise the relevant group, while Liberal-Cosmopolitans argue that the 
relevant group for redistributive concerns is the human race in its entirety.  Put 
differently, Liberal-Statist and Liberal-Cosmopolitans agree that distributive justice 
claims and duties should equally be imposed on all group members; they just cannot 
agree what the relevant group is.   
The stagnated liberal debate over global distributive justice is by and large a result 
of the implicit assumption that the proper standard is an impartial justice standard that 
would be applied to an agreed upon group.  The inadequacy of the current global 
distributive justice debate suggests that a partial standard may offer some useful insights 
as discussed below.   
 
B.  Relational (Partial) Distributive Duties 
In contrast to an impartial framework for evaluating distributive justice, this 
Article offers a new relational framework.  While impartial-justice claims try to 
determine what intrinsic attributes trigger distributive obligations among individuals, this 
new framework tries both to determine what relational attributes trigger them and to 
correlate the levels of distributive obligations with the nature and intensity of these 
relationships.  It also tries to elucidate whether (and which) voluntary relationships carry 
with them any redistributive claims.   
Unlike endowed relationships—e.g., relationships between compatriots—real 
world relationships require actual connections among specific individuals and groups.55 
The rights and obligations emerging from these relationships are always agent-dependent, 
and therefore partial,56 because they require agents to prefer allocating their scarce 
resources to those whom they chose to engage with.  The relational framework thus seeks 
to correlate levels of obligations among people with the nature of their relationships with 
one another.   
This notion of relational duties is intuitive and straightforward.57  Individuals 
associate different levels of obligations they owe other people according to the nature of 
their relationships.  The level of obligation may vary, but most people will probably agree 
that I should have some special obligation towards my cousin, another soldier in my 
(reserve) platoon unit, and a fellow member of my faculty—even if I am not especially 
friendly with any of them.  The questions of whether one possesses a right, and whether 
that right is of the (stronger) negative nature of not to be harmed, or of (weaker) positive 
nature to receive assistance, seem arbitrary and futile.  For example, consider the question 
of whether my brother and I have an “obligation” to treat each other respectfully.  I claim 
that most people would find the question irrelevant, given our binding long-term 
relationship which requires us to act decently to each other.  Additionally, if I talk to a 
close friend with vicious sarcasm, how important is the question of whether I am 
violating one of his negative rights (not to be harmed) or a positive right (to be treated 
                                                 
55 Thus a relationship between parents to their non-adult children may not fit well into this framework 
because it is not entirely voluntary.  Relationships between adult family members may be more appropriate. 
56See generally Tomas Nagel, The View form Nowhere, 164-66  (Oxford 1986)  
57 Robert Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable, 24  (1985) 
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with respect)?  Consider also the situation of a small lifeboat filled with twenty strangers, 
one of whom possesses all the food.58  If that passenger decides to deny it from the 
others, do the nineteen other passengers have any claim against the food-endowed-
passenger who they have just met for the first time on the lifeboat?  If they do, is the 
food-endowed-passenger denying their negative or positive rights by denying them food?  
The answer is that most people regard common philosophical classifications of 
rights as futile—because the distinction among those amorphous categories tends to blur 
in ongoing relationships.  Moreover, these classifications have little to do with human 
experience—especially in close settings.  Human moral reaction tends to respond to the 
fact that there are many potential agents that have duties to satisfy the rights of a specific 
individual and that those obligations correlate with the intensity of the relationship and 
the capacity of the duty holder.   
A number of factors shape our moral intuitions about whether a certain 
relationship raises relational duties.  Relationships based on reciprocity and cooperation 
trigger some sense of duty, even if entered into voluntarily.  This is especially true when 
these are long-term relationships with costly exit options.  The special vulnerability of 
one party may also establish a sense of moral duty in the other party.  For example, a 
professor may feel a different moral duty when interacting with another professor than 
with an eighteen year old freshmen college student, even though legally they are both 
adults.  Sometimes, just the capacity to help, which may be determined by arbitrary 
geographic proximity, is enough to trigger or to materially intensify a sense of duty 
towards another party.  Additionally, although arbitrary from an impartial-justice 
philosophical perspective, people tend to form small interdependent relationships with 
individuals with whom they share something in common.59   
It is important to point out that, so far, my argument has been modest in scope.  
While I demonstrated that most people seem to recognize through their deeds the 
existence of moral relational duties, I have not yet claimed that these relational duties 
require any institutional response of the state or explain how they should relate to (non-
relational) impartial-justice duties in a world of scarce resources.   
Relational duties are in fact typically recognized as an issue of ethics—the moral 
values that should govern human behavior, which is different from the question of what 
principles should govern the structure and operation of political institutions.  The 
philosophical inquiry of whether one can distinguish ethics from justice goes (well) 
beyond the scope of this paper.60  From a practical legal-perspective, it is important to 
note that liberal legal regimes have a default presumption that favors freedom of 
contracts, which essentially means that individuals are not subject to any exogenous 
relational duties when voluntarily structuring their relationships.61  This “voluntarist” 
default is subject to many exceptions, however.  Many branches of law in liberal states—
e.g., family law, labor law, consumer protection law and utility regulation—tend to 
                                                 
58 Onora O’neill, Lifeboat Earth, in International Ethics 267-68, (Charles R. Beitz, et al. eds., 1985). 
59 The factors which trigger this sense of duty can range from biological endowment, historic and religious 
background, hobbies and economic activities.  See Soran Reader, Distance, Relationship and Moral 
Obligation, 86 The Monist 367  (2003) 
60 See generally Liam B. Murphy, Institutions and the Demands of Justice, 27 Philosophy & Public Affairs 
251  (1998). 
61 Samuel Scheffler, Relationships and Responsibilities, 26 Philosophy & Public Affairs 189  (1997) 
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intervene in long-term relationships with inherent high exit costs or when consistent 
vulnerability of a certain party is observed.     
Political philosophers tend to avoid the discourse of relational duties when 
examining issues of justice.  Relational duties require a bottom-up reconstructionalist 
approach, which tries to elicit conclusions about moral behavior from observing and 
comparing actual human practices.  This differs from the impartial-justice top-down 
analytical approach, which questions the morality of political institutions by making 
assumptions and logically questioning their validity and implications.  In the context of 
relational duties, this reconstruction cannot yield any clear results about what duties are 
owed through which relationships and, more importantly, how to divide the responsibility 
to fulfill duties owed to a specific individual among a group of different agents with 
whom he or she shares relationships.   
The inherent ambiguity about the proper standards of relational duties could be 
understood as the primary reason for why liberal political philosophy adheres to impartial 
argumentation.  As mentioned, impartial arguments establish general rules, which are 
applicable to all.  Because of that, even though it is unreasonable to reject the existence 
and moral validity of relational duties, political philosophers tend to assert that general 
normative duties of justice should be given priority over relational ones.  Hence, 
relational duties are integrated with universal duties, but they are considered secondary 
and supplemental in nature.   
This conception is well embedded in the practice of the liberal state.  Even though 
the state intervenes via regulation in many types of relations, the main re-allocation of 
wealth is done through the state’s tax-spending mechanism.  Therefore, even though I am 
morally required to support my poor relatives, I am only allowed to do so while using my 
after-tax money—meaning, after I have fulfilled the impartial distributive justice duties to 
my compatriots.   
 
IV.  Limitations and Assumptions of the New Framework 
Up to this point, this Article has primarily discussed the Liberal-Statist Liberal-
Cosmopolitan debate and commented on the little progress that has been made to make 
this debate relevant to actual decision-making about the design of international political 
institutions.  It has further explained the difference between impartial-justice claims, 
which philosophers use to analyze the way political institutions should function, and 
relational duties, which govern personal relationships.  It now turns to combine two 
distinct fields of thought: distributive political philosophy and international trade and tax 
policymaking.  Integrating the disciplines—so as to make normative theory more 
applicable, and international trade and tax policy more just—is a challenge that requires a 
new framework.   
This framework requires separating the questions of what should be the proper 
role of impartial justice and the question I address—whether in a multi-state reality 
relational duties impact what people owe to one another, globally, and whether this 
impact requires any institutional arrangement.  This requires accepting the existence of 
the multistate political structure, and that the current political structure of international 
institutions is not able to support the Liberal-Cosmopolitan ideal.  However, the approach 
I propose does not directly draw on either the Liberal-Statist or Liberal-Cosmopolitan 
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approaches.  This allows both Liberal-Statist and Liberal-Cosmopolitan to consider the 
Article’s approach  without disposing of their respective positions. 
 
A.  A Realistically-Utopian Agenda 
This Article asks how we should promote considerations of global distributive 
justice within the existing multi-state political framework.  Such a process requires a 
normative institutional analysis, which reconsiders the operation of existing political 
institutions.   
This differs from other inquiries (e.g., Rawls’s “Theory of Justice”), which 
commence by examining moral principles and then trying to conclude what a just society 
should look like if it were designed from scratch.  The main difference is that an 
institutional analysis begins with reality and then acknowledges which parts of it to 
embrace and which to challenge.  This process requires deciding what the acceptable 
limits of practical political considerations are, and to designate them as the boundaries of 
the analysis.  Because these boundaries depend on dynamic human practices, they are 
inherently contestable.  Thus, a normative theory that wishes to deal with and re-shape 
reality must also explicitly address these boundaries.62  This Article’s “realistic utopia” 
adopts three assumptions, each of which I consider as straightforward and conservative—
though not beyond challenge.63  The ambition of this Part is therefore not to engage in a 
normative discussion about the desirability of the below assumptions, but to use these 
quasi-descriptive assumptions as an Archimedean point to develop the realistically 
utopian normative analysis. 
The first assumption is that wide-scale global redistribution cannot be based on 
principles of rectification.  Correcting past harms is an appealing notion and is indeed 
possible in a few clear-cut cases.64  However, the complexity of human history65 and the 
difficulty of determining causality66 make rectification an arduous and potentially 
impossible task.  As such, the attempt to integrate large-scale distributive considerations 
into international institutions should not be based upon corrective justice.   
This assumption, that real world justice entails synchronic rather than diachronic 
justice, is crucial to the analysis.  Developing countries such as Sierra-Leone, Rwanda 
and Pakistan have no special claims against their former European colonialists—France, 
Belgium, and the United Kingdom—asking them to correct the wrongs done to them.  
Colonialism was anything but benevolent, but it is hard to determine whether it 
positioned countries in a worse position than what they would have been absent it.  
                                                 
62 Sanjay Reddy, The Role of Apparent Constraints in Normative Reasoning: a Methodological Statement 
and Application to Global Justice, 9 Journal of Ethics 119  (2005) (stating that distinguishing constraints 
from what is changeable is a difficult part of every attempt to deal with issue of distributive justice in the 
global context). 
63John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 11  (1999) 
64 E.g., the past harms of slavery and the genocide of indigenous people by colonial powers.  However, 
even in these cases, it is difficult to say who should compensate – is the Chilean Indian entitled to 
compensation from Spain or from a fellow Chilean of Spanish origin.   
65 Trying to determine the duty of rectification between countries such as Poland, Russia and Germany 
would be very difficult if one takes a broad historic perspective. 
66 As mentioned, even in the case of clear exploitive relationships e.g., colonization – it is difficult to 
determine whether some of the problems we see in developing countries today are a result of colonization.  
For example, would it be right to assume that high rates of children’s mortality from preventable diseases 
in these countries is a result of colonization or would the rates be even higher in absent of colonization. 
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Would peoples in the above countries have better or worst political institutions absent 
colonialism? Would children mortality rates in those developing countries be higher or 
lower?  
Few people in the developed world realize that it cuts both ways, however.  
Developed countries may not categorically reject distributive claims by arguing that they 
directly result from developing countries’ inabilities to establish adequate political and 
legal institutions.  To be sure, questions of developing countries’ institutional competence 
will bear significance on how to satisfy any distributive claims.  However, to determine 
whether these claims exist and their nature, the assumption that international distributive 
justice does not involve corrective justice requires us to focus upon actual relationships 
among peoples and look at actual measurements of poverty and inequality.   
Second, this Article assumes that global institutions will not replace states in the 
near future.  Therefore, any suggestion for an institutional redistributive scheme should 
take into account the existence of the multi-state multi-sovereign international arena.  
Even though states would be increasingly influenced by other states, state-based political 
institutions would retain the ability to determine most aspects of their tax-spending and 
foreign relations policies.  The implication of this assumption is that any Liberal-
Cosmopolitan distributive scheme would not be able to overcome problems of 
accountability and explicit conflicts between various sovereigns.  This assumption also 
presupposes that any stable global order will continue to depend on each nation-state’s 
ability to provide legal, financial, and administrative infrastructures to support it.  Hence, 
in the absence of dominant supra-national or international players, cooperative efforts of 
nation-states have the best chance of successfully establishing a sustainable scheme of 
large scale cross-border redistribution. 
This assumption is a factual one, and not a normative claim about the morality (or 
immorality) of nation-states.67  In other words, I do not assume that states “are just” but 
merely that they “are.”  I ask the reader to accept that states are currently the only 
dominant players in global political arena, and that they are currently the only framework 
in which schemes promoting notions of impartial distributive justice exist.  The analysis 
hereafter draws only on the existence of this state of affairs—and remains mute on the 
question of whether it is morally just.  
With the minor exception of the European Union,68 recent history informs us that 
peoples are reluctant to concede nation-state powers to global or international 
institutions—possibly because they have bias preferences towards their compatriots, and 
want political institutions that reflect them.69  For example, Medicaid is a relatively 
expensive domestic redistributive program that provides low-income compatriots with 
costly health insurance.  The argument that it is immoral to spend money on Medicaid 
until all humanity has been guaranteed a certain minimum baseline of health coverage 
would strike almost all residents of developed countries as wrong.  Whether correct or 
                                                 
67 This differs significantly from any claim that States themselves are moral units and that the international 
system should be treated as an “international community” or a “society of nations” in which each nation 
has certain rights and obligations.  On this issue see Ethan B. Kapstein, Models of International Economic 
Justice, 18 Ethics & International Affairs 79  (2004) (describing what such an internationalist position 
would entail). 
68 The recent rejection of the EU constitution is a reminder how unordinary, and fragile, this exception is. 
69 Diane M. Ring, What's at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate? International Tax and the Nation-State, 49 
Va. J.of Int'l L.   (forthcoming 2008).   
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not, these intuitions are strong and bound to shape political arrangements in the 
foreseeable future.   
The third assumption is that individuals care about foreigners’ human suffering 
and violations of their rights.  Even though individuals feel stronger sentiments towards 
their compatriots, they do not categorically reject foreigners’ situations from their moral 
concern.70   This assumption suggests that even though institutional considerations of 
democratic accountability may prevent liberal democracies from engaging in 
cosmopolitan-egalitarian actions,71  foreign policy of liberal democracies is not limited, 
categorically, from addressing normative claims associated with foreigners’ needs and 
suffering.  Recent phenomena, such as the growing popularity of the fair trade movement 
and of NGOs dealing with international development,72 indicate the validity of this 
assumption.  These phenomena reflect that our contemporary social welfare function 
should be modified to include the condition of foreigners in some way. 
 
B.  Integrating Relational Duties into International Political Arrangements 
This Article argues that global trade may result in relational-distributive duties 
between peoples.  Unlike relational duties between individuals, these relational duties 
require an institutional response, and international taxation may offer a plausible avenue 
to facilitate such a response.  A careful analysis is needed to clarify the scope of this 
Article because questions of wealth redistribution are always complicated and 
multilayered—especially when dealing with global redistribution.  Hence, the Article 
limits its analysis to address the following three types of questions: 
1) What, if any, is the source of global distributive duty? Which considerations 
give certain individuals the right to claim that other individuals living in a different 
country should be morally obliged to transfer resources to them without any tangible 
return? 
2) Once the right of certain individuals has been identified, how should the 
relative distributive burden be shared among those that are required to transfer some of 
these resources? 
3) What institutional scheme should govern those redistributive transfers? 
In more concrete terms, the following Parts proceed by answering the following 
three questions: Why (voluntary) international trade results in relational-distributive 
duties between peoples; why these duties require a political response; and why the ITR 
may be an appropriate institutional arrangement to accommodate these distributional 
concerns. 
Noteworthy, this Article does not discuss in depth the following questions 
concerning global distributive justice: 
1) What should be the “currency” of justice?  There is strong disagreement among 
scholars about what should be a proper benchmark to measure and remedy disadvantages 
                                                 
70 For interesting discussions of this issue see Richard Arneson, Do Patriotic Ties Limit Global Justice 
Duties?, 9 Journal of Ethics 127  (2005); Allen Buchanan, In the National Interest, in The Political 
Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism 111, (Gillian Brock & Harry Brighouse eds., 2005).. 
71 Jack Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55  Stan. L. Rev. 1667  (2003)  
72 See generally Laura T. Raynolds, et al., Fair Trade: The Challenges of Transforming Globalization   
(Routledge. 2007) (Parts II and IV describing the growth and development of the fair trade movements in 
Europe and North America). 
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that require distributive justice considerations.  Scholars have suggested a number of such 
“currencies”—including opportunities,73 primary goods,74 and capabilities.75  
2) How much should be contributed in order to satisfy the distributive claim?  
Does the answer to this question depend on the situation of the potential receiver of the 
transfer, or on the capacity of the transferors to sacrifice?  This question may have an 
additional aspect to it, which is how is the distributive duty of an agent affected by the 
non-compliance of another agent?76   
These latter two questions are typically related to the (first) question of the source 
of the redistributive duty but are not inherently part of this Article’s core inquiry, which 
is concerned with the source of the global distributive duty and the institutional 
framework through which it could be realized.77  However, the Article contends that the 
answer to these questions of currency and depth of global redistribution should be made 
with reference to the capabilities literature—as advanced by Martha Nussbaum and 
Amartya Sen.78 
The integration of relational duties into global political institutions offers a 
promising avenue for achieving real-world progress on issues of global wealth 
redistribution. The introduction of this new framework requires briefly elaborating upon 
the relationships between relational-duties and impartial justice claims.  The framework I 
propose neither nullifies nor affirms the moral desirability of the Liberal-Statists or 
Liberal-Cosmopolitan justice ideals.  I do not discuss the role of relational duties in the 
intra-state context at all.  In the international context, I argue that relational duties exist in 
                                                 
73 Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 Philosophy and Public Affairs 283  
(1981). 
74 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 54  (1999). 
75 Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice (2006); Amartya K. Sen, Development as Freedom   (Oxford 
University Press. 2001). 
76 Suppose, for example, that both Singapore and Australia are competing against each other and need to 
invest in their infrastructure to do so successfully.  Both have a distributive duty to transfer funds to 
Indonesia but Singapore refrains from meeting its obligation.  As a result the situation in Indonesia is 
aggravated.  The question therefore is whether Australia (which has the capacity to donate more) is affected 
by Singapore’s refusal to comply.  On the one hand the situation in Indonesia is worsened – so that more 
money is required to allow the basic provisions which justice entails.  On the other hand, Singapore’s 
refusal places Australia in a competitive disadvantage – because it is unable to match Singapore’s 
infrastructure investments.  One would expect this question to be most relevant in the international arena 
due to the lack of a central authoritative enforcement mechanism.  See generally Liam B. Murphy, Moral 
Demands in Nonideal Theory (Oxford University Press. 2000). 
77 I feel comfortable with addressing “just” the first three questions given that the debate of global 
distributive justice is still in its preliminary stages, and that no theory has yet articulated how real-world 
policies should address questions over the depth of international redistribution. 
78 This theory was developed primarily by Sen and Nussbaum, and it stresses the key capabilities that 
human beings need to have an opportunity for a meaningful life.  The capabilities discourse they establish 
reject wealth (and economic growth) as the sole measurement of moral impermissible disadvantages but 
also limit it to material universal categories common across the globe (capability to transport, to read, etc).  
The terminology of basic capabilities allows Sen and Nussbaum to advocate for a core human minimum 
that should be available to all human beings and to avoid issues of relativism and cultural imperialism.  See 
George F. Demartino, Global Economy, Global Justice – Theoretical Objections and Policy Alternatives to 
Neoliberalism   (Routledge 2000); Martha Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, in Global Justice 
and Transnational Politics, (Pablo De Greiff & Ciaran Cronin (Eds.) eds., 2002).; Amartya K. Sen, 
Development as Freedom   (Oxford University Press. 2001);Leif Wenar, The Legitimacy of Peoples, in 
Global Justice and Transnational Politics 67 & 70-73, (Pablo De Greiff & Ciaran Cronin (Eds.) eds., 2002). 
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parallel to questions of whether impartial-justice claims should be validated.   Simply 
put, even though this Article focuses upon relational duties, it acknowledges that other 
(cosmopolitan or humanitarian) duties may arise in the international context. 
It is clear that relational-distributive duties among peoples matter more when 
institutions promoting impartial-justice do not exist.  However, even if those institutions 
did exist, relational duties would still be important because there is a potential political 
tradeoff between how broad the group of right holders is and the amount of rights 
allocated.  If impartial-justice concerns are going to be implemented on a broad global 
basis, the political reality dictates that there would be pressures to provide only the very 
minimum to every person.  Education and health are essential services, but “good” 
education and healthcare require funding that goes well beyond “the minimum” provided 
by the impartial global justice guarantee.  It is therefore easy to see how relational duties 
may still be of potential significance even if there is a political structure that guarantees a 
certain minimum to all human beings.   
For example, let us assume that I have a relational duty to help my brother when 
he is sick.  I argue that this duty is independent from whether we live in a country that 
provides universal health insurance to all its citizens.  Obviously, my relational duty 
would be affected by the health benefits provided by the state as part of its impartial 
justice commitment to its citizens.  If my brother and I live in a state with no universal 
health insurance, my duty to him may be substantial.  However, if my brother needs more 
assistance than provided by the state, I would have a relational duty towards him even if 
we lived in Sweden, which has a generous and universal state-funded health system.   
In the same way that my brother’s entitlement for state health benefits impacts but 
does not categorically eliminate my relational duties to him, a cosmopolitan regime 
would not eliminate relational duties among peoples.  Relational duties are, therefore, an 
independent source of moral duty and not a second-best instrumentalist way of promoting 
an, otherwise utopian, cosmopolitan ideal. 
  
V.  Distributive Relational Duties and International Trade  
Although the process of globalization may not have brought peoples to a state of 
interdependence that justifies Liberal-Cosmopolitan impartial-justice claims, 
international trade is a type of relationship that in certain cases gives rise to distributive 
moral duties.  Even though participation in this enterprise is mostly voluntary—and 
therefore assumingly beneficial to all parties—the allocation of benefits arising from the 
interaction between the advantaged and the disadvantaged is morally contestable.  
Peoples living in developed countries benefit from the disadvantages and low bargaining 
powers of peoples from developing countries.79  While the former enjoy unprecedented 
high standards of living, the majority of the latter suffers from inhuman labor conditions 
and can barely attain basic health care, education, and decent living standards. 
People have some obligations, such as fair business conduct, towards others to 
which they are connected through trade relationships.  In the context of a world 
characterized by extreme inequality, affluence, and poverty, these fairness duties have a 
broader scope that includes redistributive considerations.  These redistributive 
considerations are less stringent than domestic redistributive duties.  I argue, therefore, 
that even though United-States citizens have distributive duties towards fellow 
                                                 
79 Part V.B advances a comprehensive discussion of this controversial claim. 
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disadvantaged compatriots, they also have some (less stringent) distributive duties to 
foreigners.  Simply put, I owe more to the people serving in my army and washing the 
dishes at my nearby restaurant than I owe to persons in China manufacturing my shoes 
and to farmers in Brazil raising my coffee.   However, I also have some distributive 
duties towards the foreigners I am indirectly engaged with through trade.  These 
redistributive duties are triggered by our continuously growing interaction with each 
other as repeated players in the joint economic enterprise of international trade.   
To establish the above claim, I first discuss how the phenomenon of 
“globalization” has placed peoples in a joint economic system.  I then show that even 
though international trade is voluntary, it may give rise to relational duties when market 
transactions are not fair transactions, and when the parties benefiting from this unfairness 
have the capacity to remedy it.   
 
A.  Globalization as Proximity  
The growing intensity of global trade and the growing penetration of global 
markets have essentially connected people through economic relationships, which once 
were limited to the domestic state.  Fifty years ago, most individuals’ economic relations 
were within the boundaries of their locality or domestic state.  In today’s world, 
individuals are still likely to have a dominant set of domestic affiliations, but also equally 
likely to have multiple other affiliations.  International trade essentially brings people 
“closer” together by connecting them in ways that once were limited to close geographic 
settings.   
Proximity has been widely recognized as a source of special duty.80  From a 
relational duties perspective, proximity is a proxy for the existence of meaningful 
relationships.  Individuals are more likely to share an interdependent long-term 
relationship with their neighbors and colleagues than with distant strangers.   
Globalization thus challenges the value of geographic proximity in a world with 
developed global financial and commodity markets.  Distance-wise, peoples are not 
anymore closer today than what they were in the Middle Ages; however, global economic 
liberalization positions them now as parties to long-term trade relationships.  Through 
                                                 
80  With respect to relational duties it is widely recognized that proximity has an intrinsic value.  Few will 
disagree that I have a duty to aid a drowning person in Michigan lake, even though it is nothing more than a 
coincidence that he is drowning next to me. See generally  Liam B. Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal 
Theory , 127-32  (Oxford University Press. 2000) (making the special case for rescue). However , even 
scholars that deal with impartial rather than relational justice have recognized it is a relevant instrumental 
factor because of division of labor considerations. Rather than assigning all individuals with equal 
responsibilities towards everything, some type of allocation is desirable.  In this context, proximity is a 
proxy for a reasonable allocation because it reduces the transaction costs associated with resource-transfers.  
This proxy is valid though not exclusively due to the increasing capacity to efficiently transfer resources to 
distant locations. Recent improvements in transportation and information technologies significantly reduce 
the costs associated with information finding and transfer of resources to many places that were considered 
beyond reach less than half a century ago.  See Charles R. Beitz, Cosmopolitan Ideals and National 
Sentiment, 80 J. of Philosophy 591  (1983) (recognizing that the proximity can be a source for special 
duties, which is astonishing given the author’s well known cosmopolitan position); Charles R. Beitz, 
Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment, 80 J. of Philosophy 591  (1983);Robert E. Goodin, What is 
So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?, 98 Ethics 663  (1988) ;  Karen Green, Distance, Divided 
Responsibility and Universalizability.(Moral Distance), 86 The Monist 501(17)  (2003).   
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this relationship, formerly discrete economies have now been drawn “materially closer” 
to each other.81   
In essence, globalization is the accelerated mobility of assets and ideas within 
new integrated and interconnected market settings that transcend the nation-state.  
Although commerce among nations is not a new phenomenon, globalization has created 
an unprecedented level of economic interconnectedness among peoples.  Massive flows 
of direct and portfolio cross-border investments, which once were fairly rare, are now 
made on a daily basis,82 and many businesses depend on foreign suppliers, customers and 
service providers.   
Nation-states’ regulatory gap exemplifies the extent to which market integration 
has changed our economic relationships.  Democratic sovereignty entails that people 
should be able to determine certain aspects of their lives through an egalitarian process of 
political participation.  However, global markets have created certain regulatory 
problems, making it difficult to effectively regulate some major issues on the state level, 
because both the markets affecting those issues and the agents participating in those 
markets have become global.  These issues include vital economic issues such as 
environmental concerns over global warming and the stability of financial markets.83  
Globalization’s pervasiveness may be best reflected in the recent food and financial 
crises.  For example, the growing demand for oil and food products by the growing 
economies of China and India, and the decision of the United States government to 
reduce its dependency on oil by encouraging the use of corn for ethanol, have resulted in 
severe food insecurity and social turmoil in parts of the developing world.84  This 
example does not suggest that the current food crisis is “the fault” of the United-States or 
any other country.  It does suggest that given the interconnectedness of global markets, 
the attempt to relegate the meaningful economic relationships that give rise to relational 
duties only to the domestic or local spheres is somewhat artificial and obsolete.85   
Like domestic market settings, global market settings are not neutral but political 
and require intensive cooperation.  Countries typically seek this cooperation through legal 
and political devices—mainly treaties and international institutions—that enforce 
contractual and property rights.  Accordingly, international markets do not operate in a 
                                                 
81 Mark Beeson, Globalisation, the State and Economic Justice: Paper for Ethics and Australian Foreign 
Policy, Symposium at the University of 
Queensland,   6 (2003) 
82 Ilan Benshalom, The Quest to Tax Interest Income: Stages in the Development of International Taxation, 
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83 Simon Caney, Cosmopolitanism and the Law of Peoples, 10 Journal of Political Philosophy 95  (2002) 
(arguing that environmental issues can no longer be regulated effectively on the national level and that this 
fact challenges Rawls’s assumption that the international structure of the international differs 
fundamentally from the nation state structure). 
84 For a somewhat similar analogy see Henry Shue, Mediating Duties, 98 Ethics 687  (1988). 
85 Much of the criticism of Liberal-Cosmopolitans against the Liberal-Statist theory of Rawls, is that it does 
not account to this change in global economy.  His attempt to draw a moral line around state boundaries 
suggests that he sees the nation state as independent and somewhat self sufficient.  The critics of Rawls 
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seen as isolated, autarkic or independent.  Charles R. Beitz, Justice and International Relations, in 
International Ethics 295, (Charles R. Beitz, et al. eds., 1985).; Simon Caney, Cosmopolitanism and the Law 
of Peoples, 10 Journal of Political Philosophy 95  (2002). 
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vacuum but within a well developed set of legal and coordination norms.86  Moreover, 
the ideology driving the recent flourish of global trade is also anything but neutral.  It 
stresses that the key to increasing human welfare is economic growth achieved through
stable adherence to free trade and liberalized economic structur 87
 
e.    
                                                
The most visible aspect of the novel interconnectedness between peoples is the 
emergence of international institutions and agents.  Whether an MNE, a multi-national or 
international governance institution, an advocacy group, or an NGO—these cross-border 
agents organize to meet their goals in ways that challenge our nation-centric conceptions.  
Here, I focus on two key international agents: international institutions that coordinate 
rules related to economic activities and MNEs.   
The norms, rules and principles governing the operations of international 
institutions like the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO are the common carrier of global 
trade.  These Western-dominated institutions coordinate international trade through a 
bundle of norms and proceedings, which serves two important functions.  First, it 
standardizes many aspects of international trade by providing a set of coordination norms 
that reduce the transaction and uncertainty costs of cross-border investments.  These 
criteria allow international trade to operate as a global public good through a grid that 
allows interaction and efficient allocation of resources, thus yielding non-exclusive and 
non-rival benefits that increase as more parties interact through it.  International 
organizations determine the criteria and supervise their enforcement—mainly through 
reporting but also through arbitration procedures.   
These functions highlight the second role of international institutions: being the 
gatekeepers of access to the public good of international trade.  Although each sovereign 
nation’s compliance with the criteria set by these institutions is voluntary, countries 
wishing to benefit from international trade must de facto accept all of the conditions set 
by international institutions.  Hence, when the IMF and the WTO delineate their rules, 
they are actually delineating the costs of access to international trade and investment 
markets.  In a global economy, in which peoples’ welfare has become so dependent on 
international trade, non-compliance with those rules becomes merely a remote and formal 
possibility for many sovereigns, no matter how controversial these rules may be.88  For 
example, in response to the third world debt crisis during the 1980s, the U.S. Treasury, 
the IMF and the World Bank devised a set of conditions to developing countries seeking 
aid known as the Washington consensus.89  Some of these conditions reflected sound 
policy, which was of direct interest to the IMF and other international lenders (e.g., fiscal 
discipline).  Other conditions, however, reflected a strong neo-liberal bias, and could 
therefore be seen as an ideologically skewed interference in the internal policies of 
developing countries (e.g., an emphasis on requirements for trade liberalization, 
 
86 To an extent, the division of labor in world economy demonstrates the high level of cooperation between 
the different economies (and also indicates how well entrenched the neo-classical economic ideology  is 
entrenched in the process of globalization).  See also Charles R. Beitz, International Liberalism and 
Distributive Justice: A Survey of Recent Thought 51 World Politics 269  (1999).   
87 Omar Dahbour, Three Models of Global Community, 9 Journal of Ethics 201  (2005) (describing this 
model as a community of trade).   
88 Philippe Van Parijs, Global Distributive Justice (XXX?) (providing the example of the Washington 
consensus as a type of ideologically skewed arrangement coercively promoted by the IMF and the World 
Bank on developing countries). 
89 Walter Goode, Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms 476  (Cambridge University Press 5th ed. 2007) 
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privatization, and deregulation).  Viewed wholly, the process of rulemaking and norm-
setting has far reached beyond the original purpose of coordination.  It has become a 
process that allows international institutions to reformulate the economic design of 
sovereigns.90  
MNEs offer a different challenge to nation-centric conceptions.  In the past half 
century, the number and reach of MNEs expanded dramatically and now control 
enormous economic and investment powers.  By employing economies of scope and 
scale, which allow them to reduce collective costs and utilize intangible-assets efficiently, 
MNEs are the crown jewel of modern economic integration.  They command the lion’s 
share of Foreign Direct Investments (“FDIs”) and conduct much of the high profile R&D 
and manufacturing activities considered essential to technological advancement and 
economic growth.  Operating in multiple jurisdictions, MNEs are huge generators of 
economic activity and, in a sense, have become de facto setters of standard business 
behavior.  At the same time in which MNEs affirmed their strong position in global 
economy, their affiliation to specific national jurisdictions gradually weakens.  For 
example, MNEs’ nationally diversified shareholders, operations, employees and 
consumers have made it difficult to analytically identify any specific MNE with a 
specific nation.91  MNEs therefore demonstrate that the regulatory gap, in which 
standard-setting economic powers lie, are beyond sovereigns’ control.92 * 
The above observations avoid either criticizing or embracing the current global 
order and the way it facilitates international trade and investment.  They do suggest, 
however, that looking at international trade as either a “natural” development or as a set 
of sporadic and unrelated transactions is wrong and misleading.  International trade 
performs in a market that, like any other domestic market, is a product of a political 
construct that governs the rules through which agents interact.  Even the decision not to 
try to subordinate different aspects of global markets to any single sovereign is a political 
decision from which some benefit while others lose.93   
As a result of this political decision-making, global markets have become 
structured networks of long-term interdependent relationships that require political 
cooperation.  The cooperation we see today amounts to an economic association.  A 
                                                 
90 Pablo De Greiff & Ciaran Cronin, Introduction: Normative Responses to Current Challenges of 
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91 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 
Harv. L. Rev. 1537  (2000).  
92 In many cases, this regulatory gap is not necessarily a negative development—governments are not ideal 
regulators, and in many cases MNEs operating in places with weak or corrupt governments introduce 
higher standards.  
* [think how much I want to go on with this- after all this is the topic of the next paper- I can go to the 
who are we article type of argumentation; go into the tax competition argument—I think at least at 
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93 For example, the decision not to have a single tax authority, which coordinates tax enforcement and rates, 
allows affluent individuals with liquid assets to pay fewer taxes by shifting their profits to low tax 
jurisdictions.  It also triggers a dynamic of tax competition between different sovereigns.  Affluent 
investors, typically from developed countries, are better off and their low-income compatriots are worst.  
Low tax countries may be better off because of the surplus of investments but also may be worse off 
because of the lower tax yields and their ability to provide less services to their citizens.  See Ilan 
Benshalom, Taxing the Financial Income of Multinational Enterprises, Va. Tax Rev. (forthcoming 2009). 
 31
country’s membership in this association has significant implications on its economic 
structure and on its citizens’ lives.  These implications, to be sure, are still far less 
invasive in comparison to the power states exercise over their citizens.  However, given 
the high exit (or non-entrance) costs of this association, it is reasonable to expect that 
some moral relational duties should exist between its participants.  When a coal mine 
collapses in China because of inadequate safety measures, is it only the responsibility of 
the Chinese government that set lax regulatory requirements or is it also the moral 
responsibility of the high-ranking employees and investors of the MNE that owns it, or of 
the MNEs that purchase its cheap product?  If a shoe company employs children in 
sweatshop conditions in Indonesia, is it only the Indonesian government’s moral 
responsibility to alleviate these conditions or is it also the responsibility of the company’s 
shareholders, top-management employees and consumers?   
International trade connects peoples together in ways that once were confined to 
domestic settings.  These types of relationships in the domestic setting are often a source 
of special relational duties and responsibilities.  It is widely recognized that optimal 
business strategies, growth, and innovation require abandoning obsolete nation-centric 
conceptions.  By the same token, the global economy’s interconnectedness requires us to 
examine our relational duties through a global-cross-border perspective and not to limit 
them to the domestic sphere.   
 
B.  Which Type of Economic Relationships Give Rise to Relational Duties 
That international trade allows people in different countries to connect despite the 
geographic distance does not explain why international trade connections result in 
relational-distributive duties.  My answer is that current international trade exhibits a 
disturbing pattern, which gives rise to relational duties.  This conclusion means that the 
voluntary nature of trade transactions is not enough to vindicate them as fair.  This 
requires close scrutiny, after all, parties are assumingly rational; therefore, they engage in 
global trade only if they benefit from it.  While this may be true, peoples living in 
developed countries benefit from it unevenly.  This skewed allocation of benefits is not a 
coincidence but a direct result of the vulnerability of peoples living in developing 
countries.  In addition, there are two other factors that—even though they are not 
necessarily unfair themselves—exacerbate the immorality of this pattern: the inability of 
developing countries to exercise effective control over the rules governing global trade 
and developed countries’ (unfulfilled) capacity to better assist developing countries.  
Coupled together, this gives residents of the developed countries an unfair advantage—
and results in a situation where the market equilibrium is arguably not always a fair one.   
Before proceeding, it is important to stress two points. First, my argument is 
distinguished from the Liberal-Cosmopolitan position, which argues that international 
settings are sufficiently like domestic ones.  Instead, I focus on the actual attributes of 
international trade relationships and claim that many of them are unfair and give rise to 
distributive duties. To be precise, I do not yet argue that these relational duties should 
trigger an institutional response (a task that Part VI focuses on), but only that they exist in 
certain international trade relationships.   
Second, as Part III.B. establishes, the claim that individuals may have certain 
obligations to those they interact with draws upon a rich philosophic literature of ethics. 
Not everyone agrees that ongoing interaction among individuals can result in relational 
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duties, but this is a fairly well established field of thought in moral philosophy and a one 
which most (non-economists) seem to intuitively accept and act upon.  The previous 
Subpart established why in an integrated global market consideration about relational 
duties should not categorically be limited to operate solely within the framework of the 
state. This Subpart, takes the argument a step further and asserts that the current practice 
of international trade between developed and developing countries exhibits an unfair 
pattern that triggers relational duties.   
Trying to precisely define an “unfair pattern” is as futile as the attempts to define 
tax avoidance or pornography. Nevertheless, like tax avoidance and pornography, we 
cannot offer a comprehensive definition of it but we “know it when we see it.”94 This 
article tries to go beyond the “know it when we see it” test and single out a number of 
factors that characterize the mainstream cases of unfair patterns. Accordingly the analysis 
below highlights the main attributes of transactional unfairness and addresses only those 
relatively stronger cases of unfairness in which all the attributes apply.  Nevertheless, 
this approach implicitly assumes some overlapping consensus for what unfairness is, and 
therefore is suitable to address only clear cut cases rather than those at the margins.95  
Generally, we may define transactional unfairness as a situation in which a party 
utilizes a disadvantage of a counterparty to seek self-serving benefits at the expense of 
another party in a way that is legal but immoral.96  The immorality of the behavior raises 
a relational duty to amend it (so that it is no longer unfair) or to compensate the exploited 
party in other ways.97  The problem with this type of inquiry is that any voluntary market 
transaction is generally assumed to be profitable to all parties.  The claim that one party 
generated excessive or unfair returns must rely on a hypothetical benchmark of an 
alternative transaction with different allocative outcomes—a benchmark that in most 
cases simply does not exist.98  Accordingly, rather than providing a full theory of 
transactional fairness, this inquiry can only enumerate a number of factors that seem to 
indicate the existence of unfair advantage in the context of international trade.  To 
distinguish between fair and unfair voluntary trade transactions, this Article focuses on 
objective indicators.   
The first factor needed to demonstrate an unfair advantage is that individuals in 
developed countries benefit from global inequality and poverty in developing countries.  
Benefiting from a comparative advantage is the essence of trade, however, so this factor 
is usually satisfied.  Hence, to prove the existence of a relational duty, it is necessary to 
first explain why trading with Indonesia, which has comparative advantages in low wages 
and low safety regulations, is different from trading with Finland, which offers a 
comparative advantage in high human capital (particularly electric engineering expertise).   
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Obviously, the existence of the benefit factor alone is not enough to prove 
unfairness.  The second factor, therefore, is that trade results in relational duties when the 
allocation of benefits is skewed.  Hence, even though both parties fare better than if they 
had not entered the transaction, one party yields the lion share of those benefits.99     
The outcome that may suggest an unfair pattern is when one party, typically the 
party supplying cheap labor or scarce natural resources, trades a lot of its resources in 
exchange for a level of compensation that does not allow it much more than survival.  
Granted, like any other political theory that tries to determine sufficiency standards in our 
dynamic world,100 it is difficult to draw the line between what is mere survival and what 
is an option for a decent life.101  Nevertheless, it seems relatively straightforward to argue 
that if a party at full employment cannot afford food, shelter, and security, as well as, 
minimal health care and primary education services necessary to support a family, they 
have not reached a decent standard of living.102  This is a somewhat minimalist and 
simplistic definition of decency, but I adopt it here to minimize controversy on this point 
because it is a relatively conservative definition. 
To make my definition even more conservative, I further assume that to indicate 
an unfair allocation of benefits, the party-alleged-as-exploiter should be able to attain a 
decent living standard, even without the transaction.  This is somewhat of a 
simplification, since one can imagine a more nuanced situation in which the unfair 
allocation exists between two parties that do not attain a decent standard of living or 
between two parties that both achieve such a decent standard.  However, this assumption 
suffices for the purpose of this analysis, which is concerned with examining clear-cut 
cases of relational duties that arise from international trade relationships, and not with 
providing a comprehensive theory of transactional fairness.   
Demonstrating the outcome factor of unequal benefits of a trading relationship is 
a necessary but not sufficient indicator for an unfair trade pattern.  The core of the 
distinction between “fair” and “unfair” lies in the unequal bargaining position and one 
party’s capability to transform the other party’s vulnerability to a business advantage.103  
This is the exact opposite of neo-classical economics.  Rather than looking at the United 
States-Indonesia relationship only as a manifestation of the comparative advantage 
principle, it argues that the American investors and consumers are exploiting a 
comparative weakness of individuals living in Indonesia.  Hence, to avoid overriding the 
moral validity of all commercial relationships, we must have a clear idea of what counts 
as vulnerability.  Put differently, I am not denying that U.S. trade with Indonesia meets 
the Pareto efficiency principle but argue that Pareto improvement is not always enough to 
validate the fairness of a transaction.  
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To substantiate the above claim, it is necessary to distinguish incidents where 
benefiting from a comparative disadvantage of the counterparty amounts to an unfair 
advantage.  Observing mainstream human conduct suggests that vulnerability has an 
important role in determining relational obligations.104  Voluntary market transactions are 
not always perceived as fair when one party suffers from an endowed disadvantage (in 
relative and absolute terms), which significantly reduces its bargaining power when enter 
potential market transactions.105  Disadvantaged parties are de facto forced to entering 
long-term economic relationships even though their market returns do not provide for 
decent lives because they simply do not have any acceptable alternatives.106  This type of 
disadvantage is of particular concern when it is not something the disadvantaged can 
directly control and when it perpetually reduces or slows down their ability to attain a 
decent life through market participation.   
When a party’s profit comes primarily from the other party’s ongoing misfortune, 
this behavior tends to be seen as unfair.  Unfortunately, human history is full of examples 
of these types of behaviors.  These can range from extreme scenarios—e.g., some Polish 
and Lithuanian individuals that extracted huge amount of resources from ghetto-
imprisoned starving Jews in return for basic food products during WWII107—to 
contemporary “everyday” occurrences where American employers take advantage of 
their employees’ illegal immigration status to deny them basic labor rights and 
employment conditions.108  The Lithuanian and, even more so, the Polish people, did not 
imprison the Jews in the ghetto, since they were also subject to an involuntary occupation 
by Natzi-Germany.109 In the same way American employers could not be held directly 
responsible to the poverty that led illegal immigrants to come to the United States. 
Nevertheless, even though the non-vulnerable parties described did not directly 
contribute to the vulnerability of the other parties, the transactions were “voluntary” and 
the disadvantaged parties would be worse off if the transaction had not occurred, we 
regard their behaviors of as exploitive and morally faulty.  We resent non-disadvantaged 
parties from selfishly utilizing their comparative advantage in these scenarios because it 
is based on their counterparties’ misfortune and suffering.  
This point merits more attention.  While it is clear that human beings resent those 
who take advantage of the vulnerable, this resentment may not be justified normatively.  
There seems to be a sound case that if redistribution towards the vulnerable is deemed 
desirable by society, then society as a whole should bear the cost and responsibilities of 
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this redistribution.110  Such arrangement would arguably be more efficient than the 
distortion of market transactions.111  To argue that there is a normative need for relational 
duties, one has to provide more than a knee jerk reaction to explain why voluntary 
transactions in which parties take full advantage of their counterparties’ vulnerability are 
unfair and normatively undesirable.   
There are a number of possible responses to this challenge.  First, if there is a 
strong and consistent observation that the vast majority of people perceive a certain 
transaction as morally faulty, the discussion of why relational duties should protect 
vulnerable parties may not be necessary.  Since we are dealing with an actual human 
society, the fact that something may overwhelmingly seem wrong may suffice to raise 
relational duties.  For example, let us assume a society where a large portion of the 
population considers it wrong for people to work at bakeries for more than ten hours per 
day or sixty hours per week because of the hard labor it involves. In such a society, 
bakery owners may have a relational duty not to take advantage of the low bargaining 
powers of their vulnerable employees to “overwork” them. Even though vulnerable 
employees’ low alternative employment possibilities would compel them to work more 
than what is considered reasonable in that society, employers may have a relational duty 
not to take advantage of this vulnerability.  This argument is a positive reflection about 
the state of affairs in a given society, and not so much a normative argument.  
Nevertheless, it makes sense that in a society which has cohesive norms, relational-duties 
that follow those norms would be an integral part of how this society operates. 
The second response relies on the positive assumption that vulnerabilities cannot 
be sufficiently reduced by market mechanisms, by actions of social agents (such as state 
sponsored welfare institutions), or by voluntary actions of private parties.112  This, in fact, 
assumes that a certain degree of uncompensated vulnerability is an inherent part of 
human society.  In this state of affairs, it would be counterproductive to strip private 
parties from any duty to protect the vulnerable, because such a stripping would give those 
parties socially undesirable incentives to exploit these vulnerabilities.  Without relational 
duties all duties to protect the vulnerable would be relegated to social agents such as the 
state.  Without relational duties, private parties and communities would have the 
incentive (and social legitimacy) to maximize their wealth by exploiting the comparative 
disadvantage of the vulnerable even though they know that there is no real other 
protection available to them.  Thus, in the absence of relational duties, the ultimate goal 
of providing more protection to the vulnerable may be severely undermined.  For 
example, let us assume a society that seeks to protect individuals that because of social 
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and genetic endowment were not able to obtain a good education.  Among other things, 
this protection would allow these vulnerable individuals to make well informed decisions 
about sophisticated mortgage products.  In this society, mortgage sellers should have 
relational duties to adequately explain the different contracts they are selling to potential 
“unsophisticated” consumers.  Otherwise, the social goal of protecting this vulnerable 
group would not be adequately met.   
The third response is, in a sense, a combination of the two former ones. This 
argument states that the absence of relational duties to protect the vulnerable would result 
in negative expressive value externalities.  In a given society, where as a positive matter 
there is a goal of protecting the vulnerable, it is inconceivable to have private parties and 
communities engage in exploiting their vulnerability.  Such exploitation would project a 
vision of society that does not care of the vulnerable and would thus have negative 
externalities upon intangible social fabrics—e.g., trust, solidarity and human 
compassion—which are necessary for a well-ordered functioning society.  This is a very 
strong argument because it explains not only why private parties may have relational 
duties but also why they should not be compensated by social agents when they incur 
costs to meet those duties.  For example, let us assume a society which values racial 
equality.  In this society, employers may have a relational duty not to discriminate against 
minority group members.  Given the strong social stand against discrimination, it would 
also be unreasonable to compensate employers that hire employees that come from 
minority groups.  Even if such a reimbursement was administratively possible, it would 
project a vision that minority group members are indeed different and inferior. 
The above three justifications for relational duties stress what all of us know from 
our daily lives’ experiences—that as a matter of ethics, and not necessarily as a matter of 
law, we are all required not to take full advantage of others’ vulnerability.  We therefore 
should be able to characterize a Pareto-efficient transaction as unfair if it involves a 
vulnerable party who is not able to attend a basic minimum decent living standard, and 
when the benefits are unevenly skewed towards a party that is able to live above that 
standard (even without the benefits that the transaction with the vulnerable party confers 
it with).  
Providing a full list of potential vulnerabilities is beyond the scope of this Article.  
However, in the context of international trade, a few important ones should be mentioned, 
including: food insecurity, acute financial insecurity, lack of relevant expertise or 
information, and the inability to cope with an effective cartel or monopoly arrangement.  
Even though not all people living in developing countries suffer from these types of 
endowed disadvantages and not all people living in developed countries are immune from 
them, people living in developing countries are much more likely to suffer from these 
disadvantages. 
The conclusions of the above analysis may seem counterintuitive to many living 
in developed countries.  After all, the prevalent perceptions are that people living in 
developing countries that are “taking our jobs,” are getting “higher relative returns” and 
using “our money.”  All these statements are true to some extent, but they do not change 
the fundamental point that I have stressed—that upon interacting with peoples that are 
materially disadvantaged (in both absolute and relative senses), we need to put some 
moral constraints on our ability to seek self serving profits.  The voluntary nature of the 
transaction and the fact that those people would fare worse in its absence are not, 
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therefore, materially important.  To produce cheaply, many individuals working in 
developing countries work in harsh and unsafe labor environments.  Given a viable 
ability to earn their living in a different way, most individuals would choose not to work 
in these places, but they are pushed to do so by their poverty.  We take advantage of their 
poverty in ways that we would regard as immoral if they were to happen in the closer 
domestic setting.  For example, very few will contend that the following Pareto-efficient 
transactions are moral: buying a kidney from a compulsive gambler who will lose all of 
the money, or denying basic work safety conditions from employees that enter the 
country illegally.  In short, human beings tend to regard a transaction as immoral when a 
party with desperate need receives very low returns when performing an unsafe or 
degrading task.  We do not need a comprehensive definition of transactional fairness to 
know the above transactions are not fair, and, by the same token, we do not need such a 
definition of fairness to see that our trade relationship with peoples in developing 
countries may not be fair.  
It is worth examining how this analysis applies to international trade in concrete 
terms.  It is, I believe, not controversial to see how global inequality translates to 
developed countries’ privilege.113  Poverty’s low standards of living and low levels of 
human capital formation in developing countries result in low wages, lax regulatory 
enforcement, and under-priced natural resources—all designed to attract foreign 
investments.  These factors result in higher purchasing power in developed countries and 
in higher yields to investments made (primarily) by their residents. 114   
Developing countries and people living in them strive for foreign investment and 
cannot afford to reject certain investments and certain jobs. The vulnerability and low 
bargaining powers of developing countries dictate that certain types of economic 
activities with high long-term negative externalities are shifted to them.  Businesses 
associated with these externalities include pollution-intensive industries and businesses 
that benefit from low labor standards—e.g., gender based exploitation of young women, 
and lax safety regulation in dangerous workplaces.   
Strong economic growth, however, is rapidly mitigating some of these 
disadvantages in certain countries—but not in all of them.  Even in countries with robust 
growth figures (e.g., China and India) where market forces increasingly provide this 
change, a majority of people are still unable to attain basic health care services, adequate 
primary education, and basic services (e.g., running water).  Many developing countries 
in Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and South America are far from reaching a state were the 
majority of the population attains a decent life style and many of them (including the 
majority in China and India) will not reach it in the next decade or so.  This means that 
even though economic growth allows for tremendous progress, child mortality from 
preventable diseases would probably continue to be very high in all these countries, at 
least in the next ten years.  Furthermore, given the low educational infrastructures in 
many of these emerging economies, new generations of young adults are entering the 
                                                 
113 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Global Inequality: Bringing Politics Back In, 23 Third World Quarterly 1023  
(2002) 
114  Charles R. Beitz, Justice and International Relations, 4 Philosophy & Public Affairs 360  (1975); 
Thomas Pogge, Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties, 19 Ethics & International Affairs 55  
(2005).  For a contrasting view see Mathias Risse, How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor? , 33 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 349  (2005). 
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global labor market with little prospects of attaining anything more than low-skilled low-
wage jobs.  Although market forces are pushing towards a convergence in living 
standards across the globe, this process of convergence is simply too slow given the dire 
need.  The “radical inequality” between developed and developing countries therefore 
helps to maintain somewhat of a vicious cycle.115  Regardless of whether one thinks that 
this is the responsibility of developing countries, it is important to recognize that in this 
cycle are individuals from the developing world that participate in global trade with few 
chances to realize a genuine opportunity for a decent life.  
Three elements intensify the immoral nature of this pattern.  First, the dominance 
of developed countries in the institutions governing global trade has resulted in many 
examples in which trade arrangements favor developed countries.116  The most well-
known incident of this is the agricultural exception in trade agreements.117  The 
international trade regime encourages the liberalization of services and commodity 
markets pushing countries to reduce their trade barriers and liberalize their import and 
export markets.  However, this same regime that promotes liberalization also specifically 
allows countries to protect (through tariffs and subsidies) their domestic agricultural 
producers.  This exception is primarily made to shelter the agricultural sector in 
developed countries from competing with foreign imports from developing countries.118   
Conspiracy arguments that the IMF, WTO, and OECD operate as a cartel to 
advance the interests of developed countries and theories of capture are exaggerated.119  
However, the fact that many developing countries have little influence on these 
institutions and are primarily rule-takers is undisputed.  Certain international institutions 
dominated by developed countries can therefore materially and non-reciprocally 
influence the economic structure of developing countries.  Given the public good 
characteristics of the global trade and the difficulty of exiting its “voluntary” 
arrangements, this regulation without representation is morally disturbing.  Global trade 
rules entangle peoples in developing countries in path-dependent arrangements without 
ever giving them any substantive voice to influence those rules.120 
Second, the growing capacity of developed countries to reduce global inequality 
and poverty’s most devastating effects contributes to the moral discomfort created by 
international trade.121  As mentioned, the relatively modern phenomenon of enhanced 
                                                 
115 Thomas Pogge, Real World Justice, 9 Journal of Ethics 29  (2005) (coining the term “radical inequality” 
as pervasive inequality that keeps the worst off in a bad position in both relative and absolute terms). 
116 Thomas Pogge, Priorities of Global Justice, 32 Metaphilosophy 6  (2001) (mentioning that the 
economic infrastructure of trade has been structured to favor the interests of developed countries, including 
intellectual property protections, environmental standards, and taxation conventions).  See generally Ethan 
B. Kapstein, Distributive Justice and International Trade, 13 Ethics & International Affairs 175  (1999) 
117 On this issue see Dani Rodrik, One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and 
Economic Growth 222-23  (Princeton University Press. 2007) 
118 Agriculture is still a relatively labor-intensive industry, in which developing countries have the 
“comparative advantage” of low wage. 
119 Helen V. Milner, Globalization, Development and International Institutions: Normative and Positive 
Perspectives 3Perspectives on Politics 833  (2005);  Michael Pendlebury, Global Justice and the Specter of 
Leviathan, 38 The Philosophical Forum 43  (2007). 
120 Kok-Chor Tan, Critical Notice of John Rawls's The Law of Peoples: With the 'Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited', 31 Canadian Journal of Philosophy   (2001)  
121 F.M. Kamm, The New Problem of Distance in Morality, in The Ethics of Assistance 60, (Deen K. 
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economic growth has only recently enabled the majority of individuals in developed 
countries to attain enough surpluses over what is required for them to pursue decent lives.  
Hence, even though a more egalitarian distribution of resources was always a theoretical 
option, for the first time in human history, the majority in developed countries can retain 
a decent standard of living even if they “give up” some of their comparative advantages.  
Third, the awareness in developed countries of issues of global poverty and 
inequality does not allow us to ignore these issues anymore.  Global trade is ancient, but 
electronic media and international NGOs have only recently made the information about 
the consequences of global poverty and inequality so readily available to the general 
public.   
The analysis of this Section should not be interpreted to suggest that specific 
parties should not engage in cross-border trade transactions because they are unfair.  In 
fact, in a competitive market, parties do not have the privilege to engage only in fair 
transactions.  Neither the potentially exploited party nor the potential exploiter has any 
ability to influence the economic equilibrium, even if they regard it to be an unfair one.  
In the context of international trade and investments, firms increasing their costs in order 
to provide higher-than-market returns to parties in developing countries would be driven 
out of business given their lower competitive yields.   
 
C.  Relational-Distributive-Justice and the Coffee We Drink 
The above argument suggests that international trade entails some unfair patterns, 
which may therefore result in relational obligations.  It further implies that in a 
competitive market, correcting unfair patterns cannot be assigned to private agents.   
An example may help to illustrate this point.  Coffee is an agricultural product 
raised in many developing countries.  For simplicity, let us assume that coffee is a 
standard commodity with no significant quality variations.  Let us further assume a 
scenario in which the average price of coffee to end consumers in the developed world is 
$5 per pound, while the coffee farmers sell it in an average price of 5¢ per pound.  The 
return that the farmers receive for their crops allows them to attain only subsistence level.   
The price variation reflects, of course, no malice.  Coffee could be grown in 
almost every developing country with a tropical climate; therefore, there is a high 
potential supply of it.  In many of these countries, agriculture is the only/main possible 
source of employment because of the low human capital resources and the lack of 
industrial infrastructure.  Hence, a competitive market is bound to reduce the returns of 
coffee farmers to subsistence levels.  Under the assumption that the retail coffee markets 
in developed countries are competitive, the difference of $4.95 per pound between the 
price paid by the coffee distributors to the farmers and the price paid by the end 
consumers reflects the real costs born by the coffee industry (e.g., transportation, 
advertisement, etc.).   
Let us further assume that the vast majority of the individuals from developed 
countries operating in this industry (as investors, consumers and/or employees of firms in 
the coffee trade business) enjoy an above-decent lifestyle. Many would think that the 
price paid to the coffee farmers is “unfair” because if they were paid 20¢ per pound 
instead of 5¢ (4% rather than 1% of the retail price), the farmers’ living standards would 
rise dramatically—enabling them to attain basic goods such as good education for their 
children and better health care services (that would further allow them to reduce the 
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number of mortalities caused by preventable diseases).  If such a uniform price increase 
would occur, the price to the end coffee consumer would increase by no more than 3%.  
If the demand for coffee is not completely elastic, and coffee is not completely 
interchangeable with other products such as tea, this change should not significantly 
affect coffee sales.  Additionally, most individuals from developed countries operating in 
the coffee industry will retain their high living standards.   
True as the above may be, an individual coffee importer cannot buy the coffee 
from its producers in any more than 5¢ per pound.  Given coffee’s homogeneity, and the 
market returns requested by everyone working in the coffee processing and distributing 
industry, such an importer would be out of business because of its higher costs.  In reality 
as in theory, the global competitive market benefits the end consumer. Indeed, in the last 
decades we have witnessed how international trade contributed to an excessive and 
unprecedented increase in the consumption power and living standards of residents in the 
developed world. These excessive (and one can even say infra-marginal) gains to end 
consumers in the developed world align with the intuition that the benefits of 
international trade are in many cases unfairly skewed.  
Liberal-Cosmopolitans will find this example troubling.  Why do people in the 
coffee industry owe anything to the coffee farmers and not to the farmers’ neighbor—a 
barber—who just by coincidence does not take part in the coffee trade?  This objection 
overlooks a point made earlier that relational duties exist in parallel to whether one 
agrees that there is any Liberal-Cosmopolitan duty.122  People in the coffee industry may 
have special relational duties towards coffee farmers even if all humans (barbers and 
farmers alike) would have been granted a certain minimum by a Liberal-Cosmopolitan 
political arrangement.   
A somewhat different response is that Liberal-Cosmopolitans’ farmers v. barbers 
challenge misses the essence of the relational duties’ argument.  Barbers, as well as other 
service providers, could be seen as part of the coffee-farming community.  Members in 
this community are working hard to supply consumers in developed countries with the 
products they desire.  While the coffee-farming community fares better with foreign trade 
than without it, its members are still far from having a “decent” living standard, which 
they could attain if their developed-world counterparts were willing to sacrifice a very 
small component of their profits. The relevant question therefore is not what is the 
difference between the farmer and the barber, but whether our benefit from the extreme 
poverty of the coffee-farming community, and this community’s dependency on us, 
increase our moral obligations towards its members.     
This example serves two purposes:  First, it demonstrates that there could be a 
relatively broad agreement that certain “ordinary” international market settings are 
“unfair” even if it is difficult to perfectly define transactional fairness.  This perceived 
unfairness demonstrates that relational distributive concerns may play an important 
corrective role in voluntary international market settings.  Second, it suggests that in a 
competitive market, distributive relational obligations entail a collective-action problem.  
This is a structural problem, and addressing it requires the formation of a mandatory 
mechanism to overcome it because competitive pressures disable private agents from 
remedying it themselves. 
 
                                                 
122 See Part IV.C.  
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VI.  Institutionalizing Relational Duties 
Up to this point, this Article established that relational duties exist and that some 
features of international trade exhibit unfair patterns breach those relational duties.  It 
also demonstrated that it is impossible to address these types of problems on an 
individual level.  Here, I will explain why, in the context of international trade, relational 
duties should give rise to redistributive justice claims.  Rather than affecting our 
individual behaviors, relational duties arising from international trade should affect the 
structure of the international or supra-national political institutions governing trade.  
Accordingly, even though the relational duties are duties individuals owe to one another, 
the settlement of these claims and duties, on the international level, should be made 
among countries. 
 
A.  Close Relationships Over Long Distances and the Common Action Problem 
Increasing competitiveness in global markets makes it impossible for individuals 
to meet their relational duties.  In particular, the physical distance and the overwhelming 
number of relationships we are indirectly exposed to make it impossible for us to 
prioritize our duties towards those we do not personally know.  Therefore, even if we  
recognize that the global economy occasionally facilitates unfair trade relationships 
among individuals from developed and developing countries, we cannot satisfy our duties 
merely by changing our personal conduct.  This is a classic common-action problem, 
which should be settled by enforcing a comprehensive, involuntary standard of 
institutional intervention to help parties meet their duties without being placed at a 
competitive disadvantage. 
As mentioned, the notion of relational obligations that correlate with actual, (at 
least partly), voluntary relationships is evident in the context of our familial, social, work, 
and community-based relationships.  For example, interpersonal intimate relationships 
between adults may be subject to moral criticism, but only in extreme cases—e.g., 
polygamy, doctor-patient and teacher-student relationships—they require, involuntary 
state regulation.  Our challenge is to explain why essentially the same relational duties 
have radically different implications in the interpersonal and international trade settings. 
The key answer to this challenge is that distance and scale change our ability to 
respond to relational duties.123  International trade exposes us to a wide network of 
relationships with a lot of individuals—some of whom suffer from acute disadvantages.  
Even though trade draws people closer, geographic distance and division of labor in 
modern economic markets make it impossible to trace those disadvantages.  Individuals 
cannot be expected to undertake costly information-finding and analyzing of expenses to 
determine their actual relationships and the best way of fulfilling their relational 
obligations toward distant individuals.  This difficulty makes it implausible for a single 
party to undertake the task of determining and prioritizing among different relational 
obligations, and thus prevents them from taking actions to meet those obligations.   
Just as in the case of individuals, peoples will compete for resources.  In an 
insufficiently regulated social structure, this competition may lead to immoral actions.124  
Current international trade relies primarily on parties’ ability to advance their position 
                                                 
123 Andrew Kuper, More Than Charity: Cosmopolitan Alternatives to the "Singer Solution", 16 Ethics & 
International Affairs 107  (2002) 
124 Jeremy Waldron, Who is my Neighbor?: Humanity and Proximity, 86 Monist 333  (2003) 
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through free contractual bargaining,125 and is therefore inappropriate to address the 
problem of unfair relationships between developed and developing countries.126  Given 
this inability, international institutions need to internalize these negative moral 
externalities of global trade.  Since this is a systemic problem, and not a problem that can 
be corrected effectively through reasonable changes in the conduct of individual parties, 
it becomes an issue of justice.  Global regulation of relational duties is therefore required 
not only to improve the standard of living in developing countries, but also, and perhaps 
primarily, to help peoples of the developed world remedy the immoral consequences of 
their occasionally unfair competitive engagement in global trade arrangements.127   
It should not surprise us that socio-political institutions are needed to set a 
standard that helps individuals in the developed world satisfy their relational duties.  Part 
V.A established that trade relationships among peoples have created a complex social 
construct based on economic associations.  The operational goals and structure of this 
enterprise may differ substantially from those of the domestic state, but both are socio-
political constructs.  Our domestic experience indicates that coordinating behaviors in 
such complex social settings requires establishing political institutions that use formal 
legal devices.128  Obviously, these legal devices are crude mechanisms that help us 
satisfy relational obligations only through proxies.  However, there are likely no other 
viable alternatives.   
                                                
In Part IV.A, I assumed that states will remain the major tax and spending entities 
in the foreseeable future.  From this, I concluded that any major future global 
redistribution would have to be executed by states.  This of course is a refutable 
assumption, and we may eventually witness other actors—perhaps multinational NGOs 
such as OXFAM which rely on voluntary giving or regional associations such as the 
European and African Unions—evolve to better take such a role.  However, no paradigm 
has yet offered a viable alternative for an effective international regime that does not rely 
on state action.  Accordingly, in the context of relational duties resulting from cross-
border trade, it is useful to think of a state as an aggregate of its citizens’ relational 
duties.129   
This conclusion should not be surprising.  The argument advanced is not that, as 
an ontological matter, states are an aggregate of their citizen’s duties.  Rather I assert that 
if one accepts the relational distributive analysis, then in the world we live in, where 
states are necessary to promote any large scale redistribution among peoples, 
 
125 As mentioned our current order is facilitated by international organizations such as the WTO, IMF and 
OECD.  The ideology of these organizations is that market participation and the guarantee for freedom of 
contracts and protection of property rights are the way of improving human welfare. 
126 For analyses that reach somewhat similar observations see Ronald U. Mendoza, The Multilateral Trade 
Regime: A Global Public Good for All?, 1 Providing Global Public Goods 455  (2003); Thomas W. Pogge, 
Realizing Rawls 249  (1989). 
127 Joel Feinberg, Noncoercive Exploitation, in Paternalism (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983). (stating that state 
interference is needed not only to protect the exploited party but also to protect the exploiter from engaging 
in a behavior that inflicts moral harm). 
128 Pablo De Greiff & Ciaran Cronin, Introduction: Normative Responses to Current Challenges of 
Governance, in Global Justice and Transnational Politics 19, (Pablo De Greiff & Ciaran Cronin (Eds.) eds., 
2002). This of course is also occasionally perceived as true in domestic settings, where the state regulates 
non-monopolistic private transactions.  See supra note 1105. 
129 Alexander W. Cappelen, The Moral Rationale for International Fiscal Law, 15 Ethics & International 
Affairs 97  (2001) (making somewhat of a similar statement). 
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policymakers should think of the state construct as a way to meet the relational duties of 
their citizens.  This is a modest claim, which aligns well with the institutional analysis 
scope of the Article, which seeks to examine how existing real-world institutions should 
operate justly.    
To be sure, global trade is not new; neither are the unfair and exploitive practices 
associated with it.  The world has witnessed rapidly growing volumes of international 
trade since the early days of imperialism, which was bluntly oppressive and exploitive 
towards the developing world.  However, in the days of colonization it was easy to 
determine relational duties because members of one nation (the colonizers) were directly 
exploiting members of another one (the colonized).  Even though these duties were 
hardly ever met, it was easy as a normative matter to determine the obligation.  The 
current situation of economic integration and interrelatedness among different countries’ 
economies diffuses this chain of responsibility. As a result, we witness a web of 
international relations, which allows all developed countries to benefit from the 
vulnerabilities of developing countries but does not hold any of them responsible for that.  
This diffusion of responsibilities and the inability of private parties or state actors to un-
coordinately act against it is the essence of the common action problem which this 
proposal seeks to address.  
Determining the actual duties that states have towards others states should be 
made with reference to the following factors: their relative economic positions in terms of 
per-capita GNP (to indicate their relative inequality), their poverty measurements, and the 
volume of trade.  The poverty and inequality measurements between two trading 
countries offer a proxy for the potential existence of unfair relationships between the 
peoples.  For example, an unfair relationship is likely to exist between two countries 
when one has a GNP per-capita in the top quintile (in terms of total human population) 
and the latter has a GNP per-capita in the bottom quintile.  To provide further support for 
unfair trade relationships, it would have to be shown that the average income in the less-
developed country does not allow for a decent standard of living.  By using an average 
GNP figure, this mechanism assures that relational distributive claims would not be 
triggered towards countries with high poverty rates that result from unequal intra-nation 
wealth distributions.130   
After the standards for inequality and poverty have been determined, the existence 
of an actual relationship and the level of this relationship should be assessed. The volume 
of trade serves this function by indicating the intensity of the relational duties.131  The 
                                                 
130 For example, Russia, a country endowed with enormous natural resources, and, as a result, has a 
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relative volume of trade that specific developed countries have with a disadvantaged 
developing country could also be used to determine the relative burden that each country 
should have in fulfilling those duties.  
The above suggestion is just one example of a possible metric that could help 
establish the existence of relational duties among peoples.  In the example I gave, this 
metric relies on crude GNP measurements, because GNP is a relatively familiar and well 
established concept.  There are other indicators, however, which are perhaps superior to 
GNP.132  The factors it sets forward are dynamic and should be revised periodically—so 
that when the economic positions of two countries converge (whether because the poor 
country gets richer or vice versa), and the disparity in their bargaining positions is 
assumingly mitigated, their relational duties would be reduced and eventually eliminated.   
The Article’s suggestion, that some dynamic factors should be used in international 
agreements, is not new, and such dynamic factors do indeed play an important role in 
fundamental international agreements.133  There are other variations and alternative 
metrics that nation-states could use to measure the relational-distributive duties and 
claims of their peoples.  This Article does not claim there is only one metric through 
which relational duties could be met, but that establishing international and supranational 
institutions that promote considerations of relational distributive obligations is the 
affirmative duty of sovereigns.   
The notion that international and supra-national political institutions should be 
modified to correct systemic problems is not very controversial.  It builds on a body of 
literature in liberal thought stressing individuals’ duty to establish just institutions,134 
especially when concerns over protecting the vulnerable are involved.135 
Once a systemic injustice is recognized, establishing just institutions to correct it 
is necessary to reduce the injustice by setting a common standard with which all people 
should comply.  This common standard helps achieve two goals.  First, it makes it easier 
to determine that everyone is contributing at least their fair share—which, as in the case 
of any common action, helps to deter free rider incidents.136  Second, it sets a benchmark 
for what different parties “owe” to each other and relieves them from the constant need to 
ameliorate injustices for which they are not directly responsible. 
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B.  Understanding the Difference between Brazil and Bhutan 
The argument that relational duties are a source of global distributive claims 
differs from the more traditional impartial-justice Liberal-Cosmopolitan argument 
because it bases redistributive relational claims on actual trade relationships.  By basing 
these claims on an actual relationship, it recognizes that in a world with multiple 
sovereigns, basing cross-border redistribution on impartial factors is unsustainable.  It is 
also more intuitive than the Liberal-Cosmopolitan argument because it does not classify 
the primary allegiance individuals feel towards their compatriots as immoral.   
To illustrate this point, let us take four countries: the United States, Botswana, 
Brazil, and Bhutan.  Of the four, the United States is the richest country, in the sense that 
it has the highest per-capita GNP.137  Botswana is a poor country.  However, because of 
its relatively small population, democratic government, and huge diamond resources, all 
of its citizens have access to reasonable health and education services.    Brazil and 
Bhutan are also poor countries, but many of their citizens do not enjoy minimally 
acceptable levels of subsistence.  In these two countries the largest causes of mortality are 
preventable diseases such as dysentery; there is also no comprehensive children 
immunization program, illiteracy rates are high, and many families face food and shelter 
insecurity.   
The United States has some degree of commercial relationships with Botswana 
and practically no such relationships with Bhutan.  On the other hand, the United States 
has extensive commercial and diplomatic relationships with Brazil.  American 
corporations are heavily invested in Brazil, and American shareholders have yielded 
substantial profits on their Brazilian investments over the years.  Brazilian businesses use 
intellectual property developed in the United States, and a lot of Brazilian manufactured 
and agricultural goods are sold in U.S. markets.   
According to Liberal-Cosmopolitan notions of impartial distributive justice, 
because all human beings require equal moral consideration and/or because the United 
States shares the same economic system with the other three countries, it is required to 
transfer funds to them.  Pogge’s modified “do no harm” Liberal-Cosmopolitan argument 
would claim that the international economic order harms the poor countries, and the 
United States should compensate them for that harm.  Under the Liberal-Cosmopolitan 
approaches, Americans should provide the other three peoples with a similar and equal 
moral respect and resources so that all individuals in them may have a chance to lead 
meaningful (decent) lives.  It is important to recognize that Liberal-Cosmopolitans may 
realize that they need to compromise and as a result allow American citizens to exhibit a 
distributional preference towards their compatriots.  However, the American citizens 
would not be allowed to prefer Brazilians over the Bhutanese as long as the levels of 
poverty in both countries are the same.  The major difficulty with Pogge’s “do no harm” 
argument is that it is difficult to establish actual reasons for why Americans should be 
considered as harming Bhutan or Botswana—countries with which they have very little 
contact.   
                                                 
137 I chose these countries because there has not been any direct form of oppression or war among these 
countries in the recent past so the analysis would not be complicated by possible claims for compensation 
based on historic events. 
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Liberal-Statists such as Rawls claim that the United States has no obligation 
towards any of these countries other than in cases of acute humanitarian crises.  If 
earthquakes hit Bhutan, Botswana, and Brazil, the United States is equally obliged to help 
all of them.  Unless such a devastating occurrence happens, American citizens have the 
same non-duty relationship with poor Brazilians as they do with poor people in Bhutan.  
They should have no special duty to Brazilians raising their coffee, and have no 
responsibility if, as a result of the decision to subsidize corn for the purpose of producing 
ethanol in the United States, many poor Brazilian families experience food insecurity. 
The fact that the Brazilian economy is connected to the American economy, and rather 
dependent on it, does not strengthen or weaken Brazil’s plea for American help; 
therefore, it is in exactly the same position as Bhutan.   
Unlike the other approaches, the relational-distributive obligations I propose, the 
commercial relationships between Americans and Bhutanese are insignificant, so 
Americans may have humanitarian duties towards Bhutanese, but not relational duties.  
The case of Botswana is slightly more complicated, because its citizens may not qualify 
as poor in an absolute sense, and their commercial relationships with American are not 
very intensive.  Accordingly, if one adopts the position that relational duties should only 
exist for those that qualify as poor, it is reasonable to expect that Americans do not hold 
any relational duties towards the people living in Botswana.  If one adopts a continuum 
approach, it may be argued that the United States has to account for some, relatively 
weak, relational duties that Americans owe to people living in Botswana.   
Under the relational duties framework, Americans have major distributive 
obligations towards Brazilians.  Brazil’s poverty and unequal position suggest that there 
is a high probability for unfair exchanges between the two peoples; the high volume of 
trade between them suggests, moreover, that their relationship is very strong.  The 
relational duty framework uses trade relationships between countries as a proxy for the 
relational duties between their peoples.  Therefore, since the United States and Brazil are 
currently the best representatives of their peoples, there should be a direct correlation 
between those factors and the wealth transfers from the United States to Brazil.   
Assume that apart from the United States, Brazil has extensive commercial 
relationships with Portugal, Britain, and France.  In this case the burden of meeting the 
relational-distributive duties towards Brazil should be allocated among these four 
countries according to two factors: their actual volumes of trade with Brazil and their 
capacity to help it.  Even though in all four of the above-mentioned countries, the vast 
majority of people enjoy an above-decent living standard, there are great differences 
between Portugal and the United States, the latter commanding much more wealth and 
having a greater capacity to help. 
 
C.  Some Final Remarks 
The above proposal may raise some concerns.  First, the existence of a collective 
action problem, which makes it difficult to impose faire trade practices, reduces but does 
not necessarily nullify the possibility for fair conduct.  Some companies may actually be 
engaging in those practices today.  Therefore shifting the responsibility to the state level 
may reduce the “demand” for private fair conduct.  This may absolve existing practices, 
and be less accurate because states are only crude proxies to the level of their peoples’ 
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implication in international trade.138  The response to this concern is that adopting the 
above notion would impact the behavior of private parties (although one can imagine 
other scenarios), 139 but that this is true for any type of state and regulatory actions.  
Government action is therefore justified only if the common action is so severe that 
curtailing it would yield more beneficial results then just leaving it to the preferences of 
private parties.  Policymakers face this problem all the time—more welfare results in less 
charity, and setting state standards on environmental and safety issues may lower the 
actual practices of certain businesses.  In the above discussion I have demonstrated why 
the common action problem associated with the competitiveness and interrelatedness 
disables parties from effectively addressing the issue of fair practices.  In this setting, 
private actions can only be sporadic, anecdotal, and motivated by public relation 
concerns140—so that the benefits that stem from any potential state action would likely 
compensate for any reduction in those practices.   
Second, the Article’s argument implicitly assumes that governments are 
benevolent and competent agents serving their peoples’ interests.  This, unfortunately, is 
not the case with many governments in developing countries that suffer from weak 
institutions, low expertise, and corruption.141  It is, however, important to recognize that 
this is a general problem with any transfer to such countries, and not only with the 
redistributive transfers.  For example, when the United States and its residents enter into 
oil production contracts with countries like Angola or Nigeria, they in effect support 
corrupt governments. Very little of this oil money is invested in the people of those 
countries, some of it finds its way to private bank accounts in Switzerland and some of it 
is actually used to oppress opposition groups in those countries. Therefore, the problem 
of what corrupted governments do with money they should invest on behalf of their 
citizens is broader than the issue of redistributive payments. In the context of 
redistributive payments, there are actually some solutions that can help to partly 
overcome some of these problems.142 However, given the need to limit its scope, the 
paper will not address any of them in details.  
Third, some may regard this idea of relational-distributive duties as too limited.  
Many of the least-developed countries (e.g., many sub-Saharan countries, East Timor, 
Bangladesh) are so disadvantaged that they do not have any external trade relationships 
with developed countries.  Therefore, countries with the most dire need for external 
resources would not benefit from this framework.   
The above concerns are valid.  The advantage of the relational distributive 
framework over the Liberal-Cosmopolitan ideal lies not in its comprehensive coverage, 
                                                 
138 I thank Lee Fennell for bringing this point to my attention. 
139 For example, such a policy can help center the issues of fair conduct in the heart of the political debate. 
140 The Economist, Special Report: Corporate Social Responsibility, The Economist January 19th. 2008. 
141  Charles R. Irish, International Double Taxation Agreements and Income Taxation at Source, 23 Int'l & 
Comp. L.Q. 292  (1974) ; Mathias Risse, How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor? , 33 Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 349  (2005) 
142 My general impression is that this problem could be, partially, dealt with by having a rule that if the 
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their levels of corruption and to improve their legal institutions. See generally Dale Jamieson, Duties to the 
Distant: Aid, Assistance, and Intervention in the Developing World, 9 Journal of Ethics 151  (2005).    
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however.  The advantage of the relational setting is that it rejects the idea that cross-
border transfers of wealth are a form of charity and establishes, instead, a system of 
entitlements backed by concrete duties that address how the redistributive burden should 
be systematically and fairly allocated.  It relies on the premise that even though human 
relationships may in many cases be a product of coincidence,143 they are not morally 
arbitrary.  It achieves all this while avoiding the Liberal-Cosmopolitan absurdity, which 
requires the United States to distribute funds to Bhutan and North Korea, thus putting 
forward a claim for redistributive justice that could not be met in the absence of a world 
government. 
The relational duty theory is not a Liberal-Cosmopolitan impartial-justice theory 
because it does not try to eliminate the role of luck and coincidence.  Instead, it relies on 
intuitive notions that taking unfair advantage of the vulnerable is immoral and, most 
importantly, that people have greater responsibility to those distant peoples with which 
they have actual economic relationships.144  It also incorporates some notion of 
impartiality, because it determines distributive obligations in accordance with objective 
indicators.  For example, the United States may disagree with some policies executed by 
the Mexican or Chinese governments.  However, as long as there are commercial trade 
relationships with them, the United States must ensure that Americans’ relational-
distributive duties towards the people of Mexico and China are met. 
This Article began by explaining that liberal thinkers avoid making partial claims 
because they perceive moral arguments based on actual human interactions as less 
ambitious.  They identify partial arguments as trying to change individual conduct rather 
than the conduct of political institutions and the universal rules according to which they 
operate.145  Here, I have demonstrated that this is not necessarily the case, and that 
relational duties—which impose a systemic problem—can and should be translated to 
impartial political claims over issues of global wealth redistribution and serve to reform 
international institutions.  Combined together, my relational framework claims that it is 
immoral to ignore the interests of all foreigners but allows sovereigns to discount the 
interests of foreigners in comparison with those of compatriots.  Furthermore, it offers an 
impartial way in which the interests of foreigners should be prioritized and addressed by 
developed countries in a way that aligns with common political intuitions; it argues that 
people owe more to those that they are closely connected with and who depend upon 
them.  And, further, individuals’ relational duties depend on both their capacity to help 
and on the other party’s actual level of disadvantage.   
Finally, in a somewhat similar vain, there is a valid concern that by imposing 
duties on transactions with developing countries we would provide residents of 
developed countries a disincentive to engage in trade relationship with them. The first 
response to this is that every voluntary transaction results in a welfare surplus. When 
dealing with a vulnerable party, the non-vulnerable party is not required to give up their 
surplus, and not even to reduce it to the level in which they would be indifferent to doing 
                                                 
143 Actual trade relationships are a matter of moral coincidence. For example, I can buy my groceries in 
numerous shops—and my eventual decision to buy them in one place rather than the other is a matter of 
moral coincidence.  
144 Darrel Moellendorf, Person’s Interests, States’ Duties and Global Governance, in The Political 
Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism , 149, (Gillian Brock & Harry Brighouse eds., 2005). 
145 Thomas W. Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 Ethics 48  (1992) 
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the transaction with a non-vulnerable party, but just to allocate it more evenly. 
Accordingly, if the relational duties are imposed uniformly, there would still be benefits 
in buying coffee at developing countries rather than trying to produce it in developed 
countries, because the developing countries have some factors (e.g., sun and cheap labor) 
that make it cheaper to produce coffee. Relational duties would not eliminate the surplus, 
they would just allocate it so that the coffee farmers, and not just the Starbucks 
customers, would be able to attain basic health and education services for their children. 
The second response is that there are ways to recognize those duties without imposing 
any penalties on those individuals and business in the developed world that directly 
engage in trade with the developing world. The below analysis demonstrates how 
international tax policy could be designed to take account of such duties without 
imposing direct penalties on private parties engaged in cross border transactions.  
 
VII.  Potential Policy Implications 
Until now, this Article has dealt only with the source of the duty for redistribution 
in a world economy comprised of people living in separate nation-states, which are 
connected through (intensive) trade relationships.  It has introduced a novel conception of 
a relational global distributive duty, but did not indicate a specific institutional 
arrangement through which this duty should be fulfilled.  These relational-distributive 
duties could be met in many ways—lump sum transfers among states, global labor safety 
regulations, and anti-child labor initiatives— to name only a few examples. 
Here I want to demonstrate how the ITR could be made to promote relational-
distributive duties. I suggest that even though we think of the tax system as a way to 
primarily promote domestic distributional outcomes, international tax arrangements also 
offer a promising avenue through which relational-distributive claims could be met.  The 
ITR is the set of norms and soft law rules through which countries divide the rights to tax 
cross-border economic activities.146  Accordingly, it assumes the existence of states and 
the existence of trade relationships among them, which are the cornerstone assumptions 
of the relational-distributive duties analysis.  Since the ITR mirrors the international trade 
regime, the tax relationships between countries can serve to correct the relational claims 
arising from their trade relationships.  Instead of regulating trade and investments, ITR 
conventions can require developed countries to transfer some of their taxing rights to 
developing countries, thus addressing relational duties by serving as an indirect macro 
price-correction mechanism.  Startlingly, even though the ITR deals with allocating 
taxing rights between nations, global redistributive considerations play little (if any) role 
in policy and scholarly debates about the ITR.  Although explaining the ITR’s structure 
in depth is impossible within the framework of this Article, I briefly explain how 
relational duties should affect a number of core income tax arrangements. 
Tax distributive arrangements provide effective mechanisms and do not require 
extensive on-the-ground cooperation of foreign countries’ enforcement branches such as 
other alternatives.  However, one does not have to subscribe to the notion that tax 
practices are categorically more effective to accept my argument.  The skeptic reader 
should agree that given doubts about the effectiveness of direct trade regulation, 
                                                 
146 Michel J Graetz, The Foundations of International Income Taxation 11  (Foundation Press. 2003) 
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policymakers should be willing to consider using the ITR to meet relational-distributive 
duties of their peoples—so as not to put all the eggs in the same basket.147 
 
A.  Using International Taxation to Promote Relational-Distributive Duties 
The ITR has several distinctive features.148  Primarily, it requires an economic 
relationship that could be taxed by two nation states—meaning the existence of 
transactions that are subject to tax under the laws of more than one country.  Only present 
economic relationships trigger ITR analysis, and it only takes into account taxes levied by 
nation-states—not by state and local governments.  Hence, once a transaction has been 
identified as a potential tax subject of more than one jurisdiction, the distribution of these 
tax rights is regulated by ITR conventions.149  The ITR deals with these taxing rights 
conflicts through a set of soft law principles embedded in domestic tax legislation and 
bilateral double taxation treaties.150  Double taxation treaties are contractual 
arrangements that countries enter to reduce the risk of double taxation that would hin
trade and investment relationships between t 151
der 
hem.    
                                                
The ITR allocates wealth—in the form of taxing rights—among sovereigns when 
persons within them share some relational trade or investment relationships.  It therefore 
seems like an optimal mechanism to settle relational-distributive claims triggered by 
trade relationships.  It also aligns well with the assumptions of my analysis; it accepts the 
existence of sovereign nation states and their imperative role in any mass global 
redistribution enterprise, and develops a distributive framework that is based on 
observable current-trade-indicators, avoiding problems of causation associated with 
corrective justice.  Most importantly, it avoids both the daunting gaps in recognizing 
foreigners’ rights and the task of assigning those rights with meaningful correlative 
duties.   
Using the ITR to promote relational-distributive duties has some other significant 
benefits.  First, under the relational framework, duties correlate with the level of 
association, and this correlation is built-in into the tax arena.  For example, assume that a 
double taxation treaty between a developed and a developing country assigns 
proportionally high taxing rights to the developing country.  As the volume of trade 
between the two countries increases, the stronger their relational duties are assumed to 
be.  As their trade relationships intensify, the ITR would account for the higher level of 
duties automatically—simply by assigning more taxing rights to the developing country. 
 
147 On this issue see also Nancy Staudt, Redundant Tax and Spending Programs, 100 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1197  
(2006). 
148 Alexander W. Cappelen, The Moral Rationale for International Fiscal Law, 15 Ethics & International 
Affairs 97  (2001) (providing an excellent summary for non-tax scholars) 
149 Ilan Benshalom, The Quest to Tax Interest Income: Stages in the Development of International 
Taxation, 27 Va. Tax Rev. 631  (2008). 
150 The key example for such a principle is that when a non-resident engages in an economic activity in a 
foreign country, that foreign country has the right to first levy income taxes on the proceeds of this activity.  
The country in which that individual resides may also have a residual right to levy taxes and must provide 
some type of relief to the taxes paid in the country where the activity has taken place.  Most of these norms 
are codified in a model tax treaty published by the OECD. See OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income 
and on Capital, Jan. 28, 2003. 
151 Ilan Benshalom, The Quest to Tax Interest Income: Stages in the Development of International 
Taxation, 27 Va. Tax Rev. 631  (2008) (mentioning a variety of other reasons for which countries enter 
double taxation treaties). 
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Second, allocating taxing rights seems to be a relatively effective way to fulfill 
relational redistributive obligations.  Other ways of meeting relational redistributive 
duties could involve particular price-control and labor-law standards that would be 
difficult to regulate and enforce.152  Moreover, any attempt to regulate the production of 
goods and labor standard in developing countries seems politically infeasible because of 
the (justified) suspicion that it is really an excuse for protectionism.  Any such attempt is 
therefore likely to be classified by developing countries as an imperialist intervention and 
rejected on that account.  Developed countries can obviously address their relational 
duties also by directly spending to help others in developing countries; however, gaining 
the necessary domestic support for large lump-sum transfers would be difficult.153   
In comparison to those mechanisms, fulfilling relational-distributive duties 
through the ITR would provide a crude and more administrable macro price-correction 
mechanism.  Rather than making sure that importers of coffee pay a fair price to the 
farmers, the developing country would retain a greater right to tax the profits of this 
transaction.  It can then use the extra revenues generated to provide better services to 
their low-waged citizens.  Money is fungible, and once it is allocated to a developing  
country, there is no way to trace whether it has reached the “farmers.”  However, it will 
serve to raise the living standards and government services in a way that should also 
benefit the farmers.  Oddly, this argument relates in an interesting way with the current 
orthodoxy that the tax system redistributes more efficiently than regulation.154  
Admittedly the way in which the Article describes international taxation and its 
relationship with international trade seems to align with what critics of this orthodoxy 
claim—that the distinction between state tax and regulatory actions tend to blur on the 
margins.155  However, the Article also illustrates that the tax system is the most effective 
way to redistribute.  This effectiveness stems from the crudeness of tax rules and their 
(limited) reliance on few indicators as rough proxies to determine the appropriate 
distributive outcome.156   
Third, private parties from the developed world would not necessarily be 
penalized with excessive duties because they chose to undertake a transaction with parties 
in developing countries.  Their taxes do not necessarily have to increase because 
developed countries would be required to give up some of their taxing authority, and, 
more importantly, developing countries may choose not to exercise all their taxing rights, 
or to exercise them at lower rates to encourage foreign investment.  There is a genuine 
fear that developing countries would be forced through a tax-competitive process to omit 
                                                 
152 For example, any attempt by the WTO to set safety or labor standards in developing countries would be 
ineffective and inefficient due to the lack of enforcement and information gathering capacities.  See also 
George F. Demartino, Global Economy, Global Justice – Theoretical Objections and Policy Alternatives to 
Neoliberalism, 209-14  (Routledge 2000) (discussing some of the other alternatives that would assure that 
free trade amounts to fair trade). 
153 Alexander W. Cappelen, National and International Distributive Justice in Bilateral Tax Treaties, 56 
Finanzarchiv 424  (1999 ) (providing a brilliant analysis of this issue) 
154 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal 
Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. Legal Stud. 821  (2000).  For a different position 
see Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, , 89 Yale L.J. 472 (1980). 
155 Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance 56 
Tax L. Rev. 157  (2003). 
156 Addressing the above distinction between efficient and effective distribution is a topic that transcends 
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all of their tax rights in an effort to attract foreign investments.  These are of course very 
serious concerns for any operational global redistributive ITR arrangement, which are 
mostly relevant in the context of corporate taxation.  However, if developing countries 
are provided also with the ability to effectively waive some of the taxes to attract 
investments, this form of wealth redistribution could not be portrayed as promoting 
developed countries’ protectionism.  
In other Articles, I have stressed that the problem of tax competition is probably 
the most salient challenge facing ITR policymakers today, especially in the case of 
MNEs.157  However, the scope of the current paper is limited to discussing the normative 
claim or relational distributive duties and the general aspects of the ITR that may help 
address them.  Without undermining the difficulty that tax competition imposes on using 
the ITR as a mechanism to promote global redistribution, addressing these issues in detail 
is deferred to a future paper which specifically deals with allocating the tax base of 
MNEs.   
As I demonstrated, some of the above points involve complicated tradeoffs and 
should be viewed as promising reform options but also as potential reasons for concern.    
However, the ITR’s relational framework still appeals to a strong intuition that some 
economic relationships entail certain costs and that parties should not be able to contract 
aspects of the transaction involving negative externalities.  If international trade gives rise 
to unfair patterns, that should be corrected, and the ITR seems to provide a proper 
involuntary framework to impose those duties on specific agents.  Taxes are coercive 
costs imposed on agents to finance the government’s activities and to achieve certain 
distributional goals, and parties cannot and should not be able to exercise full contractual 
control to determine their tax treatment.  The involuntary nature of tax transactions makes 
them an ideal mechanism to address distributive concerns on both the domestic and 
international frontiers.     
Unlike the Liberal-Cosmopolitan ideal, the ITR relational-distributive justice 
framework depends upon the actual choices of agents in different countries who decide to 
interact with others.  Put differently, rather than trying to establish a flawless world, my 
proposal offers a principled framework of how to establish a system of fair international 
trade.  This is an achievable ambition and should make the ITR a plausible mechanism 
for achieving the type of global wealth redistribution that would appeal to policymakers, 
more so than any other Liberal-Cosmopolitan cross-border regulatory or transfer 
framework.158  
 
B.  The Current ITR Arena  
Finally, this Article surveys the ITR’s current institutional and scholarly arena.  It 
demonstrates how the ITR conventions developed today fall short of addressing any issue 
of distributive justice.  It then explains the sources of this conceptual deficiency and 
briefly mentions a few potential issues within the ITR income tax conventions that could 
be reformed to promote the fulfillment of relational-distributive duties.   
As mentioned, unlike the domestic realm, where philosophers, economists and 
legal scholars all recognize that tax policy is the key policy instrument to promote 
                                                 
157 Sourcing stages I-III. 
158 Richard W. Miller, Moral Closeness and World Community, in The Ethics of Assistance, 101, (Deen K. 
Chatterjee ed., 2004). (presenting somewhat of a similar argument). 
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distributive objectives, the distributive impact of the ITR has received little attention by 
the literature.  Even though more collaboration among economists, policymakers, and 
normative philosophers would generally be more desirable,159 the gap in the case of the 
ITR is especially alarming.  Philosophers concerned with promoting global distributive 
justice tend to completely neglect ITR arrangements and focus instead on how to better 
regulate trade.  In particular, they focus on issues such as privatization, deregulation, and 
agricultural protectionism as they are facilitated by institutions such as the WTO and 
IMF.160  Tax rules are complex and the tradeoffs associated with them are often not 
intuitive so philosophers tend to avoid addressing them altogether.  Tax scholars, on the 
other hand, find it difficult to offer a normative judgment about certain tax arrangements 
without a concrete foundation of a normative theory.  
One factor that could account for the gap in the literature dealing with domestic 
and international tax redistribution is the way in which ITR international institutions have 
developed over the last half-century.  Currently, there is no international organization that 
directly regulates international taxation.  Taxation has long been categorized as an 
explicit feature of national sovereignty, and, as such, there has been no substantial shift in 
taxing authority from the nation-state to international and supra-national institutions, as it 
has in the case of trade.161  The major international forum in which ITR policy is 
deliberated and coordinated is the OECD, which is a forum established and dominated by 
Western, developed countries.  The OECD has been able to create the tax component of 
the international trade public grid162 hrough the model tax treaty (and commentary) that 
helps countries to establish treaties to avoid double taxation, but also through numerous, 
reports, policy briefs and other publications dealing with tax treaties and issues of 
international taxation. the treaty and various other reports and policy briefs, the OECD 
has created a network The United Nations and the IMF have also made some efforts to 
aid developing countries in establishing their tax systems and in negotiating tax 
treaties.163  The history of those institutions indicates, however, that they have no serious 
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ambition to promote global wealth redistribution;164 this is particularly true with regard to 
the OECD, which is by far the most dominant international ITR forum.   
In this respect, it is important to note the two following notions.  First, even 
though coordination has been the main goal of the OECD, there is no a priori reason to 
think that it should be their only goal.165  If institutional reform is required to prevent 
unfair trade, the historical limitations of the ITR framework should not be seen as a 
normative constraint.   
Second, the loose level of ITR regulatory control on the actual allocation of taxing 
rights among nation-states does not mean that no allocation paradigm exists.  Even 
though coordination between sovereigns is not intensive—as in the case of trade—taxing 
rights of profits from global trade are de facto allocated all the time.  The decision not to 
engage in an explicit agreement between sovereigns about how to allocate taxing rights is 
a decision in itself, which has its own underlying implications and normative 
assumptions.  For example, the fact that we have no comprehensive multilateral 
agreement that prevents income shifting to low income tax jurisdictions does not mean 
that there is no allocation of benefits.  Sophisticated taxpayers use the absence of such a 
comprehensive agreement to allocate more income to low-tax countries such as Ireland 
and the benefits of this allocation is shared by Ireland and the investors at the expense of 
other countries.166   
As some important scholars have noted, current ITR debate adopts a neo-liberal 
discourse that highlights contractual equity considerations—e.g., reciprocity, non-
discrimination, and economic neutrality/efficiency167—and marginalizes issues of 
redistribution and poverty reduction.168  This marginalization of global redistributive 
issues should not be determinative of future actions.  The ITR involves a number of key 
issues that bear directly on the question of how taxing rights between developed and 
developing countries should be allocated.  The most well-known issue is the conflict 
between the notions of source and residency taxation.  Many countries, including, most 
notably, the United States and the United Kingdom, have reserved the right to tax the 
income their individual and corporate residents derive from their activities and 
investments in foreign jurisdictions.  Even though many other sovereigns have recently 
limited or eliminated their residency-based taxes, it has been the dominant approach 
throughout most of the twentieth century.169  The main rationale supporting residency 
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taxation is that the burden of financing the government should be allocated among 
residents and citizens in accordance with their ability to pay the tax.  Since foreign 
income has exactly the same purchasing power as income earned from domestic 
activities, it should receive precisely the same tax treatment when determining taxpayers’ 
ability to pay.170   
An additional basis of taxation is source taxation—or the right of the state to tax 
the income arising from an economic activity that is taking place within its jurisdiction.  
The rationales for taxing non-residents at the source are not self-evident.  The main 
explanations view the source tax as a benefit tax in which the country of source charges 
the business enterprise for using its infrastructures.171  Developing countries are typically 
net-capital-importers and therefore source jurisdictions; in contrast, developed countries, 
where most investors reside, have traditionally been perceived as residence 
jurisdictions.172   
In previous articles, I have argued that source rules’ notorious complexity is 
primarily due to a lack of normative comprehension as to what they are expected to 
achieve.173  The nexus which ties an economic activity to a source jurisdiction is 
primarily a normative one, and source rules are bound to be complicated as long as this 
normative benchmark is not fully elaborated.  The relational distributive analysis 
provides an example of such a normative benchmark.  When tax policymakers consider 
the scope of source and residency taxation, they should consider the impact of relational 
duties on the allocation of taxing rights between countries.  Increasing the scope of 
source jurisdiction, at the expense of residency,174 therefore, may be required for 
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developed countries to satisfy their relational-distributive duties towards developing 
countries.  This shift in the “right to levy tax” benefits the governments of developing 
countries over the governments of developed countries. However, it does not create a 
direct penalty on parties in developed countries for the trade relationships they have with 
members in developing countries and does not create any disincentives to engage in such 
trade.175  Despite the various costs associated with international trade, countries engage 
in it because they think that overall they benefit from it. Meeting the allocative cos
associated with distributive-relational duties that stem out from international trade are 
only one type of costs that should be addressed as part of that tradeoff. 
ts 
                                                                                                                                                
A simple example of how relational distributive duties could impact actual tax 
allocation arrangements may be helpful. Current ITR conventions grant the residence 
country, in which investors reside, the right to tax interest payments they receive on loans 
made to foreigners.176 The source country, in which the borrowers reside, has the right to 
implement a withholding tax on those payments, but this right is limited in two important 
ways. First, over the years, double taxation treaties have reduced withholding tax rates on 
interest, so that most interest payments are subject only to low or no withholding taxes. 
Second, any attempt of the source country to waive some of its taxing right is 
“swallowed” by the residual tax laid by the residence country. Accordingly, a source 
country, like Uganda, is effectively very limited in its ability to tax interest payments, or 
to attract foreign investors by waiving its rights to tax them. This state of affairs is by no 
means neutral or natural but a result of a long struggle between capital-importing and 
capital-exporting countries in the first half of the twentieth century.177 A possible 
arrangement that would take into account developed countries relational distributive 
duties toward developing countries would give the latter exclusive taxing rights in 
interest payments paid by borrowers within it. This would leave a source country like 
Uganda with the exclusive right to tax and with the ability to waive some of its rights to 
tax in order to attract foreign investments. 
Developed countries sometimes make certain concessions to developing 
countries—typically within the framework of double taxation treaties.  These concessions 
are, however, part of the treaty negotiation process and not a normative benchmark that 
developing countries can assert.  Current practices allow helping developing countries as 
a form of foreign policy “charity” given in the form of taxing rights which are “tax-
expenditures” and not an integral component of the tax system.178  This differs from this 
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Article’s proposal, which suggests that revising the soft law principles defining the 
international income tax base should give heed to global relational-distributive concerns.  
Accordingly, the notion that developing countries should be allocated a greater share of 
the taxing rights arising from cross-border transactions should be integrated into the 
mainstream of OECD double taxation treaty negotiation policy and into the domestic tax 
legislation of developed countries dealing with the taxation of cross-border 
transactions.179  This is only one example of how this Article’s normative analysis bears 
concrete significance on fundamental questions of allocating taxing rights among 
sovereigns.   
The most important issue of taxing rights allocation in the contemporary ITR 
arena, however, is the taxation of MNEs.  MNEs are wealthy, sophisticated taxpayers 
with an exceptional ability to reduce their tax liabilities and are also generators of 
economic activity who know how to organize particularly effective tax lobbies.180  
Therefore, the corporate tax rate is particularly susceptible to pressures of tax 
competition, and recent evidence suggests that effective corporate income tax rates on 
certain activities are very low, partly as a result of tax competition.181  More importantly, 
intra-MNE trade accounts for much of international trade and is currently one of the 
weakest links in the existing ITR paradigm, considering MNEs’ ability to manipulate 
intra-group prices to inflate their deductible costs in high tax jurisdictions and to shift 
their income to low tax jurisdictions (especially with regards to intangible-related and 
financial transactions).182  However, MNE taxation is technically complicated and 
sophisticated from a policy perspective, because it connects global relational-distributive 
duties with issues of tax-competition, tax-avoidance, and tax-cooperation.  Because of 
this complexity, and because this Article is deliberately focused on conceptual theory and 
argumentation, the precise redistributive role of relational-distributive duties on the 
allocation of the MNE tax base will be addressed in a future paper.183   
It is, however, important to note that MNEs’ dominant position in global economy 
dictates that the MNE tax base allocation bears immense international distributive 
implications and should therefore take into consideration relational distributive 
obligations.  Furthermore, many tax academics believe that effective tax cooperation is 
necessary to address problems associated with tax competition over MNE investments. 
To achieve effective tax coordination, states would have to assure that a critical mass of 
states coordinate with it. This would obviously include most developed countries, which 
are typically high tax countries, but would also have to include many low tax developing 
and emerging economies—such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, which are key players 
                                                 
179 See generally  Michael S. Knoll, International Competitiveness, Tax Incentives, and a New Argument 
for Tax Sparing: Preventing Double Taxation by Crediting Implicit Taxes   (SSRN. 2008) (providing a 
novel analysis on this issue). 
180 Julie Roin, Taxation Without Coordination, 31 J. Legal Stud. s61  (2002) 
181 James R. Hines & Adam B. Jaffe, International Taxation and the Location of Inventive Activity, in 
International Taxation and Multinational Activity, (James R. Hines Jr. ed., 2001). 
182 See generally Ilan Benshalom, Sourcing the "Unsourceable": The Cost Sharing Regulations and the 
Sourcing of Affiliated-Intangible Related Transactions, 26 Va. Tax Rev. 631  (2007); Ilan Benshalom, 
Taxing the Financial Income of Multinational Enterprises by Employing a Formulary Arm’s Length 
Allocation Mechanism, 28 Va. Tax Rev.   (forthcoming 2009). 
183 For a partial discussion of this issue see Ilan Benshalom, Taxing the Financial Income of Multinational 
Enterprises by Employing a Formulary Arm’s Length Allocation Mechanism, 28 Va. Tax Rev.   
(forthcoming 2009). 
 58
in the global economy. These developing countries typically use their low corporate tax 
rates to attract foreign investment. Accordingly, unlike the developed countries, which 
stand only to gain from effective tax coordination, developing countries may fear to enter 
such a cooperation scheme because the short-term costs may outweigh the long-term 
(speculative) benefits.  
To assure effective cooperation developed countries needs to assure a prisoner 
dilemma type of setting where all participants stand to gain from tax-cooperation. This 
can be done in three ways, which are not mutually exclusive and could be implemented 
simultaneously. First, developed countries can threaten developing countries so that they 
are penalized if they do not tax-cooperate (e.g., via trade sanctions). Second, developed 
countries can try to buy the cooperation of a sufficient number of developing countries. 
Third, and most relevant in the context of this inquiry, tax-cooperation could be 
facilitated if it involves an organizing principle which parties consider as fair. This pre-
coordination stage is essentially a constitutive moment. Upon entering a long term 
cooperation scheme, more states would be willing to cooperate if they have the 
confidence that the agreement they are entering into is a fair one, and that it would be a 
fair one twenty years down the line whether their economic position improves or gets 
worst relatively to the position of other countries. In a way, this Article addresses the type 
of questions over what is a fair arrangement that would be asked once nations realize that 
tax coordination is essential.  
Relational-distributive duties should not be restricted to income tax allocation, 
however.  Many developing countries have weak income tax regimes and rely on tariffs, 
real-estate taxation and natural resources taxation.  Relational-distributive duties require 
policymakers to expand beyond traditional ITR arrangements, which for historic reasons 
focus on the allocation of income taxation.184  
The above discussion of how the ITR’s income tax allocation could be reformed 
to promote relational-distributive duties emphasizes the importance of this Article’s 
proposal.  The relational-distributive duties’ framework aims to promote a realistic 
utopia.  Rather than erasing all flaws from the world and reconstructing novel political 
institutions, it accepts some existing political structures and tries to make the world a 
better place by pointing out how and why these institutions should promote justice.  
Rather than promoting a set of “soft” principles of cosmopolitan justice, it provides 
guidance for constructing a global system which redistributes wealth among sovereigns 
by assigning concrete entitlements and duties. 
How these duties should be assigned is not an easy task.  Globalization gave rise 
to new types of tax practices and created a powerful new class of international investors, 
comprised of MNEs and individuals with liquid wealth.  Sovereigns have found it 
increasingly difficult to address these problems by themselves.  In the long run, this 
inability to address problems of eroding tax bases would likely pressure governments to 
engage in cartel-like arrangements to combat tax avoidance and tax competition 
tendencies.  Any future tax cooperation arrangement would have to include important 
developing economies to be effective and would have to grant them some concessions in 
return for their willingness to limit the tax breaks with which they lure foreign investors.  
Developing a normative benchmark over the proper global distributive role of the ITR is 
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therefore essential to provide any future coordinated scheme with the necessary global 
political legitimacy.   
The notion that to gain political legitimacy, international institutions should be 
taking a more active role in promoting fair trade and assuring the rights of peoples living 
in the developing world has been receiving growing support.185  As such, delineating an 
international ITR framework that addresses peoples’ relational-distributive duties is 
crucial to help politically legitimize the operation of institutions coordinating global ITR 
policy.  Specifically, this legitimacy will be vital to further allow the ITR to evolve and 
meet the challenges of the twenty first century.  More importantly, however, an ITR that 
explicitly addresses issues of global relational-distributive duties would help to morally 
legitimize the political structure of global trade itself and the actions of agents 
participating in it.186 
Even though the ITR may be an effective tool to address relational distributive 
duties in a multi-state global environment, the above analysis suggests that current ITR 
arrangements require many modifications before they actually meet this goal.  This need 
for modifications does not weaken the argument for the appropriateness of the tool, 
however.  ITR arrangements are relatively superior to any type of alternative 
arrangements and the modifications required in them do not undermine the underlying 
premises of our political reality.  They do not require the abolition of states or the 
regulation of commerce in foreign countries—and they cannot be viewed by developing 
countries as unjustified imperialist intervention in domestic matters. 
 
 
VIII.  Conclusions 
This Article broadens the exploration of current political philosophy over the 
scope of distributive duties in an economically integrated world.  Our international 
trade relations give rise to relational duties to those we trade with.  These duties give 
rise to obligations when developed countries unfairly trade with disadvantaged 
developing countries, even if we cannot agree on the scope of (impartial) distributive 
justice.  These relational-distributive duties deviate from the traditional political 
philosophy debate about issues of impartial global distributive justice.  Instead of 
drawing on either Cosmopolitan or Statist theories, it draws on the intuitive notion 
that the advantaged have an obligation to establish political institutions that protect 
the vulnerable from being unfairly exploited.   
This approach of seeking justice through relationships succeeds where both 
Liberal-Statist and Liberal-Cosmopolitan positions fail, by providing guidance to real 
world policy questions of how to best construct international institutions.   While not 
the only mechanism available to construct international institutions, this Article 
demonstrated how the ITR could be modified to accommodate considerations of 
relational-distributive duties.  
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Taxes involve money, and (whether intended or not) the way sovereign states 
allocate the right to tax among each other has a significant distributive impact on the 
way global wealth is allocated.  Thinking about global wealth distribution through the 
ITR will be useful to policy makers because it accepts the existence of states and 
relies on the importance of actual relationships, which, whether we like it or not, are 
key to any real world attempt to promote issues of wealth redistribution among 
peoples. 
 
